and incorrigible "real" world; we can account for sociology by enumerating and "pointing to" the objects in the world to which sociological names and descriptions refer.

On the other hand, it is easy to see that the methodical character of marriage, war, and suicide is only seen, recognized, and made possible through the organized practices of sociology. These regularities do not exist "out there" in pristine form to which sociologists functionally respond, but rather, they acquire their character as regularities and their features as describable objects only through the grace of sociological imputation. Thus, it is not an objectively discernible, purely existing external world which accounts for sociology; it is the methods and procedures of sociology which create and sustain that world.

How then is sociology possible? How may we resolve the social order problem of sociology? How is this activity—doing sociology—achieved? Sociology exists because sociologists have managed to negotiate a set of practices for creating and acting upon external worlds. We shall have adequately described sociology and accounted for its existence when we have described these commonsense practices.

In: "Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments", eds John C. McKinney & Edward A. Tiryakian, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1970

13.

On Formal Structures of Practical Actions

Harold Garfinkel & Harvey Sacks

Harold Garfinkel was born in 1917 in Newark, New Jersey, and was educated at the University of Newark, the University of North Carolina, and Harvard University. Mr. Garfinkel is professor of sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, and is the author of Studies in Ethnomethodology.

Harvey Sacks was born in 1935. He was educated at Columbia, Yale University Law School, and the University of California, Berkeley (Ph.D.). He has taught at U.C.L.A., and U.C., Irvine, where he is currently associate professor of anthropology and sociology. He does research on conversation and has published several papers on this topic.

The fact that natural language serves persons doing sociology—whether they are laymen or professionals—as circumstances, as topics, and as resources of their inquiries furnishes to the technology of their inquiries and to their practical sociological reasoning *its* circumstances, *its* topics, and *its* resources. That reflexivity is encountered by sociologists in the actual occasions of their inquiries as indexical properties of natural language. These properties are sometimes characterized by summarily observing that a description, for example, in the ways it may be a constituent part of the circumstances it describes, in endless ways and unavoidably, elaborates those circumstances and is elaborated by them. That reflexivity assures to natural language characteristic indexical properties such as the following: the definiteness of expressions resides in their consequences; definitions can be used to assure a definite collection of "considerations" without providing a boundary; the definiteness of a collection is assured by circumstantial possibilities of indefinite elaboration.[1]

Indexical features are not particular to laymen's accounts. They are familiar in the accounts of professionals as well. For example, the natural language formula, "The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle,"[2] is heard by professionals according to occasion as a

definition of association members' activities, as their slogan, their task, aim, achievement, brag, sales pitch, justification, discovery, social phenomenon, or research constraint/ Like any other indexical expression, the transient circumstances of its use assure it a definiteness of sense as definition or task or whatever, to someone who knows how to hear it.[3]/Further, as Helmer and Rescher[4] showed, on no occasion is the formula assured a definiteness that exhibits structures other than those that are exhibited by pointed references. This is to say that when the definiteness of the expression is analyzed with prevailing methods of logic and linguistics it exhibits few or no structures that available methods can handle or make interesting. Sociology's methods of formal analysis are differently disappointed by these expressions. Their definiteness of sense is without structures that can be demonstrated in the *actual* expressions with the use of available mathematical methods, to specify a sense, definitely./ In a search for rigor the ingenious practice is followed whereby such expressions are first transformed into ideal expressions. Structures are then analyzed as properties of the ideals, and the results are assigned to actual expressions as their properties, though with disclaimers of "appropriate scientific modesty."

The indexical properties of natural language assure to the technology of sociological inquiries, lay and professional, the following unavoidable and irremediable practice as their earmark: Wherever and by whomever practical sociological reasoning is done, it seeks to remedy the indexical properties of practical discourse; it does so in the interests of demonstrating the rational accountability of everyday activities; and it does so in order that its assessments be warranted by methodic observation and report of situated, socially organized particulars of everyday activities, which of course include particulars of natural language.//

The remedial practices of practical sociological reasoning are aimed at accomplishing a thoroughgoing distinction between objective and indexical expressions with which to make possible the substitution of objective for indexical expressions. At present that distinction and substitutability provides professional sociology its infinite task.[5]

These motives and recommendations are easily observed in most of the papers in this volume, though they are perhaps liveliest in those of Blalock,

1. On pp. 348-349 the properties of indexical expressions are discussed at length.
2. Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

3. This property is elucidated in Don H. Zimmerman and Melvin Pollner, "The Everyday World as a Phenomenon," in Harold B. Pepinsky, ed. *Studies in Human Information Processing* (in press).
4. Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher, *The Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, October 13, 1958).
5. We mean by "infinite task" that the difference and substitutability motivate inquiries whose results are recognized and treated by members as grounds for further inferences and inquiries. It is with respect to the difference and substitutability as aims of inquiry that "infinite task" is understood by members to refer to the "open" character of sociological fact, to the "self-cleansing" body of social scientific knowledge, to the "present state of a problem," to cumulative results, to "progress" and the rest.

Douglas, Inkeles, Lazarsfeld, Levy, Moore, Parsons, and Spengler, who use them to locate needed tasks for sociological theorizing, to cite achievements, and to take note of available methods and results as professional stock-in-trade. The remedial program of practical sociological reasoning is specified in such characteristic practices of professional sociological inquiry as the elaboration and defense of unified sociological theory, model building, cost-benefit analysis, the use of natural metaphors to collect wider settings under the experience of a locally known setting, the use of laboratory arrangements as experimental schemes of inference, schematic reporting and statistical evaluations of frequency, reproducibility, or effectiveness of natural language practices and of various social arrangements that entail their use, and so on. For convenience, we shall collect such practices of professional sociology's practical technology with the term "constructive analysis."

Irreconcilable interests exist between constructive analysis and ethnomethodology in the phenomena of the rational accountability of everyday activities and its accompanying technology of practical sociological reasoning. Those differences have one of their foci in indexical expressions: in contrasting conceptions of the ties between objective and indexical expressions, and in contrasting conceptions of the relevance of indexicals to the tasks of clarifying the connections between routine and rationality in everyday activities. Extensive phenomena that constructive analysis has missed entirely are detailed in the ethnomethodological studies of Bittner, Churchill, Cicourel, Garfinkel, MacAndrew, Moerman, Pollner, Rose, Sacks, Schegloff, Sudnow, Wieder, and Zimmerman.[6] Their studies have

6. Egon Bittner, "Police Discretion in Emergency Apprehension of Mentally Ill Persons," *Social Problems*, 14 (Winter, 1967), 278-292; "The Police on Skid-row: A Study of Peace Keeping," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (October, 1967), 699-715. Lindsey Churchill, "Types of Formalization in Small-group Research," review article. *Sociometry*, vol. 26 (September, 1963): "The Economic Theory of Choice as a Method of Theorizing," paper delivered at the American Sociological Association meetings, August 31, 1964; "Notes on Everyday Quantitative Practices," in Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks, eds., *Contributions to Ethnomethodology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, in press). Aaron Cicourel, *Method and Measurement in Sociology* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964); *The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice* (New York: Wiley, 1968). Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967). Craig MacAndrew, "The Role of 'Knowledge at Hand' in the Practical Management of Institutionalized Idiots," in Garfinkel and Sacks, *Contributions*; with Robert Edgerton: *Time Out: A Social Theory of Drunken Comportment* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969). Michael Moerman, "Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?" *American Anthropologist*, 69 (1967), 1215-1230; "Kinship and Commerce in a Thai-Lue Village," *American Anthropologist*, 5 (1966), 360-364; "Reply to Naroll," *American Anthropologist*, 69 (1967), 512-513; "Being Lue: Uses and Abuses of Ethnic Identification." *American Ethnological Society, Proceedings of the 1967 Spring Meeting* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), 153-169. Zimmerman and Pollner, "The Everyday World." Edward Rose, "Small Languages," in Garfinkel and Sacks, *Contributions to Ethnomethodology*; *A Looking Glass Conversation in the Rare Languages of Sez and Pique*, Program on Cognitive Processes Report No. 102 (Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1967); *Small Languages: The Making of Sez*, Bureau of Socio-

shown in demonstrable specifics (1) that the properties of indexical expressions are ordered properties,[7] and (2) *that* they are ordered properties is an ongoing, practical accomplishment of every actual occasion of commonplace speech and conduct. The results of their studies furnish an alternative to the repair of indexical expressions as a central task of general theory building in professional sociology.

The alternative task of general theory building is to describe that achievement in its organizational variety. The purposes of this paper are to locate that achievement as a phenomenon and to specify some of its features, to describe some structures in the practices which make up that achievement, and to take notice of the obviousness, enormous interest, and pervasiveness which that achievement has for members, be they lay or professional analysts of ordinary activities. We do so with the aim of recommending an alternative account of formal structures in practical actions to those accounts that make up the work and achievements of practical sociological reasoning wherever it occurs—among laymen, of course, but with overwhelming prevalence in contemporary professional sociology and other social sciences as well, and in all cases without serious competitors.

Members' Methods of Sociological Inquiry

Alfred Schutz made available for sociological study the practices of commonsense knowledge of social structures of everyday activities, practical circumstances, practical activities, and practical sociological reasoning.[8] It is his original achievement to have shown that these phenomena have characteristic properties of their own and that thereby they constitute a legit-

logical Research, Report No. 16, Part 1 (Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1966). Harvey Sacks, *Social Aspects of Language: The Organization of Sequencing in Conversation* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, forthcoming, 1969). Emmanuel Schegloff, "Sequencing in Conversational Openings," *American Anthropologist* (in press); "The First Five Seconds," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology and Social Institutions, University of California, Berkeley, 1967. David Sudnow, *Passing On: The Social Organization of Dying* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967); "Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of a Penal Code in a Public Defender's Office," *Social Problems*, 12 (Winter, 1965), 255-276. E. Lawrence Wieder, "Theories of Signs in Structural Semantics," in Garfinkel and Sacks, *Contributions*. Don H. Zimmerman, "Bureaucratic Fact Finding in a Public Assistance Agency," in Stanton Wheeler, ed., *The Dossier in American Society* (in press); "The Practicalities of Rule Use," in Garfinkel and Sacks, *Contributions*; "Paper Work and People Work: A Study of a Public Assistance Agency," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966.

7. That is, socially organized in the sense in which this paper is talking of formal structures as accomplishments.

8. Alfred Schutz, *Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality*, 1962; *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*, 1964; *Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, 1966 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff); *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

imate area of inquiry in themselves. Schutz's writings furnished us with endless directives in our studies of the circumstances and practices of prac- tical sociological inquiry. The results of these studies are detailed in other publications." They furnish empirical justification for a research policy that is distinctive to ethnomethodological studies. That policy provides that the practices of sociological inquiry and theorizing, the topics for those prac- tices, the findings from those practices, the circumstances of those practices, the availability of those practices as research methodology, and the rest, are through and through members' methods of sociological inquiry and theorizing. Unavoidably and without hope of remedy the practices consist of members' methods for assembling sets of alternatives, members' methods for assembling, testing, and verifying the factual character of information, members' methods for giving an account of circumstances of choice and choices, members' methods for assessing, producing, recognizing, insuring, and enforcing consistency, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, planfulness, and other rational properties of individual and concerted actions.

The notion of *member* is the heart of the matter. We do not use the term to refer to a person. It refers instead to mastery of natural language, which we understand in the following way.

We offer the observation that persons, because of the fact that they are heard to be speaking a natural language, *somehow* are heard to be engaged in the objective production and objective display of commonsense knowl- edge of everyday activities as observable and reportable phenomena. We ask what it is about natural language that permits speakers and auditors to hear, and in other ways to witness, the objective production and objective display of commonsense knowledge, and of practical sociological reasoning as well. What is it about natural language that makes these phenomena observable-reportable, that is, *account-able* phenomena? For speakers and auditors the practices of natural language somehow exhibit these phenomena in the particulars of speaking, and *that* these phenomena are exhibited is thereby itself made exhibitable in further description, remark, questions, and in other ways for the telling.

The interests of ethnomethodological research are directed to provide, through detailed analyses, that account-able phenomena are through and through practical accomplishments. We shall speak of "the work" of that accomplishment in order to gain the emphasis for it of an ongoing course of action. The work is done as assemblages of practices whereby speakers in the situated particulars of speech mean something different from what they can say in just so many words, that is, as "glossing practices." An under- standing of glossing practices is critical to our arguments, and further dis- cussion will be found in the appendix to this chapter.

9. See footnote 6.

I. A. Richards has provided a thematic example.[10] He suggests the use of question marks to bracket some spoken phrase or text. For example, ?empirical social research?, ?theoretical systems?, ?systems of sequences?, ?social psychological variables?, ?glossing practices? instruct a reader to proceed as follows. How a bracketed phrase is to be comprehended is at the outset specifically undecided. How it is to be comprehended needs to be of a reading whereby some unknown procedure will be used to make the text comprehensible. Since nothing about the text or procedure will be used to make the while, we will wait for the while, for whatever the while. When and if we have read and talked about the text, we will review what might be made of it. Thus we can have used the text not as undefined terms but as a gloss over a lively context whose several ways, as a sense assembly pro- cedure, we found no need to specify.[11]

Richards' gloss consists of practices of talking with the use of particular texts in a fashion such that how their comprehended character will have worked out in the end remains unstated throughout, although the course of talk may be so directed as to compose a context which embeds the text and thereby provides the text's replicas with noticed, changing, but unremarked functional characters such as "a text in the beginning," "a text as an end result," "an intervening flow of conversation to link the two," and so on.[12]

Apparently speakers can, will, could, ought, and do proceed in the fashion for which Richards' gloss of a text is a thematic example, to accom- plish recognizably sensible definiteness, clarity, identification, substitution, or relevance of the notational particulars of natural language. And ap- parently speakers can proceed by glossing, and do the immense work that they do with natural language, even though over the course of their talk it is not known and is never, not even "in the end," available for saying in so many words just what they are talking about. Emphatically, that does not mean that speakers do not know what they are talking about, *but instead they know-what they are talking about in that way.*[13] Glossing practices exist in endless but particular, analyzable ways, glossing practices are methods for producing observable-reportable understanding.

Richards' gloss is merely one of these ways.[13]

10. I. A. Richards, *Speculative Instruments* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 17-56.
11. We mean that none was called for, and that in other glossing practices something else could be the case.
12. These remarks are adapted from suggestions that we took from Samuel Todes, "Comparative Phenomenology of Perception and Imagination: Part I: Perception," *The Journal of Existentialism*, 6 (Spring, 1966), 257-260.
13. This cannot be emphasized too strongly. Because we used the present perfect tense to report Richards' gloss there is the risk that our description may be read as though we were recommending that Richards' gloss defines *the* way that clear, definite speaking is done. There are others, which consist of glossing practices different from Richards' gloss. Richards' gloss is used as a perspicuous example, not as a definition.

with, in, and of natural language. As a multitude of ways for exhibiting-in-speaking and exhibiting-for-the-telling that and how speaking is understood, glossing practices *are* "members," *are* "plain speech," *are* "mastery of natural language," *are* "talking reasonably," *are* "speaking English" (or French, or whatever), *are* "clear, consistent, cogent, rational speech."

We understand mastery of natural language to consist in this. In the particulars of his speech a speaker, in concert with others, is thereby meaning something different than he can say in so many words; he is doing so over unknown contingencies in the actual occasions of interaction; and in so doing, the recognition *that* he is speaking and *how* he is speaking are specifically not matters for competent remarks. That is to say, the particulars of his speaking do not provide occasions for stories about his speaking that are worth telling, nor do they elicit questions that are worth asking, and so on.

The idea of "meaning differently than he can say in so many words" requires comment. It is not so much "differently than what he says" as that *whatever* he says provides the very materials to be used in *making out* what he says. However extensive or explicit what a speaker says may be, it does not by its extensiveness or its explicitness pose a task of deciding the correspondence between what he says and what he means that is resolved by citing his talk verbatim.[14] Instead, his talk itself, in that it becomes a part of the selfsame occasion of interaction, becomes another contingency of that part.

14. The following excerpt provides two structurally distinct examples. (1) Not only is the speaker making out from what was said, what was meant, by the person whose talk is being quoted by the speaker, but (2) the whole body of talk is introduced by the speaker as showing that its speaker knows what is meant by the talk of a just-prior speaker; that is, it is delivered with "I know what you mean" as its initial part.

J: I know just what you mean. We, we go through this thing every year. My father said, "No gifts." And we tried to analyze what—
B: Does no gifts mean no gifts or does it mean more gifts?
T: No, he, he gave us one reason why "no gifts." And I was questioning the reason. I didn't think it was his, a legitimate reason. I didn't think it was his real reason. He said. "Well, you know how the Christmas, all the stores, uh, well, make such a big killing over Christmas, killing, and Christmas is becoming commercialized, and therefore, I don't wanna be sucked into this thing. I'm not giving gifts this year."
J: "You spend your money and buy something you really want, and I'll spend my money and buy something I really want."
T: But we figured there must be something deeper, because if a guy is aware of, that Christmas is becoming very commercialized, uh, must he submit to this idea and reject it entirely, and end up giving no gifts, or is it because he really doesn't, he's not a person that likes to give anyway?
B: Yeah.
T: And this is just a phony excuse for not giving. And finally, I think we figured out it must be some kind of a, a combination, and he really isn't, that stingy.

interaction.[15] It extends and elaborates indefinitely the circumstances it glosses and in this way contributes to its own accountably sensible character. The thing that is said assures to speaking's accountably sensible character its variable fortunes. In sum, the mastery of natural language is through-out and without relief an occasioned accomplishment.

Ethnomethodology's Interests
in Formal Structures of Practical Actions

Ethnomethodology's interests, like those of constructive analysis, insistently focus on the formal structures of everyday activities. However, the two understand formal structures differently and in incompatible ways.

We call attention to the phenomenon that formal structures are available in the accounts of professional sociology where they are recognized by professionals and claimed by them as professional sociology's singular achievement. These accounts of formal structures are done via sociologists' mastery of natural language, and require that mastery as the *sine qua non* of adequate professional readership. This assures to professional sociologists' accounts of formal structures its character as a phenomenon for ethnomethodology's interest, not different from any other members' phenomenon where the mastery of natural language is similarly involved. Ethnomethodological studies of formal structures are directed to the study of such phenomena, seeking to describe members' accounts of formal structures wherever and by whomever they are done, while abstaining from all judgments of their adequacy, value, importance, necessity, practicality, success, or consequentiality. We refer to this procedural policy as "ethnomethodological indifference."

Ethnomethodological indifference cannot be viewed as a position which would claim that no matter how extensive a volume like Berelson's might become, problems yet could be found. Nor, in that regard, would it be the case that insofar as the predictive efficacy of professional sociology had an asymptotic form, one could count on a margin of error as a stable property within which research could proceed. Counting on the fact that given the statistical orientations of professional sociology one would always have unexplained variance is not our way of locating yet unexplained phenomena.

15. The developmental sense of *becomes* is intended; not its sense of a development in the past that is now finished. To emphasize "process" the sentence might be read as follows: "Instead, his talk itself, in that it is in becoming a part of the selfsame occasion of interaction is in becoming another contingency of that interaction." Similar remarks might be made about "another."

Our work does not stand then in any modifying, elaborating, contributing, detailing, subdividing, explicating, foundation-building relationship to professional sociological reasoning, nor is our "indifference" to those orders of tasks. Rather, our "indifference" is to the whole of practical sociological reasoning, and *that* reasoning involves for us, in whatever form of development, with whatever error or adequacy, in whatever forms, inseparably and unavoidably, the mastery of natural language. Professional sociological reasoning is in no way singled out as a phenomenon for our research attention. Persons doing ethnomethodological studies can "care" no more or less about professional sociological reasoning than they can "care" about the practices of legal reasoning, conversational reasoning, divinational reasoning, psychiatric reasoning, and the rest.

Given ethnomethodology's procedure of "indifference," by *formal structures* we understand everyday activities (a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the properties of uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and so on; (b) in that these properties are independent of particular production cohorts; (c) in that particular-cohort independence is a phenomenon for members' recognition; and (d) in that the phenomena (a), (b), and (c) are every particular cohort's practical, situated accomplishment.

The above development of formal structures contrasts with that which prevails in sociology and the social sciences in that the ethnomethodological procedure of "indifference" provides for the specifications (c) and (d) by studying everyday activities as practical ongoing achievements.

A further contrast between ethnomethodology's treatment of formal structures and that of constructive analysis is specified by the characteristic that it is as masters of natural language that constructive analysts recommend and understand that their accounts of formal structures provide aims and singular achievements of their technology of research and theory. It is as masters of natural language that constructive analysts understand the accomplishment of that recommendation to be constructive analysis' infinite task. Constructive analytic accounts of formal structures are thus practical achievements, through and through. Natural language provides to constructive analysis its topics, circumstances, resources, and results as natural language: *formulations* of ordered particulars of members' talk and members' conduct, of territorial movements and distributions, of relationships of interaction, and the rest.

Ethnomethodologically, such practices whereby accounts of formal structures are done comprise the phenomena of practical sociological reasoning. Obviously those practices are not the monopoly of Association members. The remainder of this chapter takes that phenomenon under scrutiny, reviewing members' methods for producing and recognizing formal structures of everyday activities by examining members' practices of *formulating*.

The Phenomenon

In that inquiries are done that make use of or are about members' talk, an inquirer will invariably exhibit a concern to clarify that talk in the interests of the inquiry. So, for example, an interviewee's remark, "She didn't like it here so we moved," may provide a researcher occasion to do such things as give that utterance a name, tell who "she" is, where "here" is, whom the "we" covers. In the large literature in logic and linguistics such terms have been called indicators, egocentric particulars, indexical expressions, occasional expressions, indices, shifters, pronominals, and token reflexives. A list of such terms would start with "here, now, this, that, it, I, he, you, there, then, soon, today, tomorrow."

We begin with the observations about these phenomena that everyone regularly treats such utterances as occasions for reparative practices; that such practices are native not only to research but to all users of the natural language; that without knowing what a particular research dealt with one could list the terms that would need to be clarified, or translated, or replaced, or otherwise remedied, and that the terms could be located and placed, or otherwise remedied, and that the terms could be located and placed, with their remedies proposed and demonstrated for all practical purposes, with or without research and with or without knowing how extensive are similar concerns of others. The large and ancient literature in logic and linguistics that bears on researchers' work is a minor tributary in the rush of that omniprevalent work.

We treat as fact that researchers—*any* researchers, lay or professional, naive or wellversed in logic and linguistics—who start with a text, find themselves engaged in clarifying such terms that occur in it. What should be made of that sort of fact? What do we, in this article, want to make of that fact?

If, whenever housewives were let into a room, each one on her own went to some same spot and started to clean it, one might conclude that the spot surely needed cleaning. On the other hand, one might conclude that there is something about the spot and about the housewives that makes the encounter of one by the other an occasion for cleaning, in which case the fact of the cleaning, instead of being evidence of dirt, would be itself a phenomenon.

Indexical expressions have been studied and have been dealt with in identical fashion times without end, not only in naïveté, but more interestingly, in apparently required disregard of previous achievements. The academic literature furnishes evidence of how ancient is that reparative work. The *Dissoi Logii*, a fragment of text from approximately 300 B.C., gives attention to the sentence "I am an initiate" because it presents diffi-

culies.[16] The issue is that of the truth or falsity of a sentence when, if said by A it was true, but if said by B it was false; if said by A at one time it was true, but if said by A at another time it was false; if said by A from one status of A it was true, but if said by A from another it was false.

To the problems posed by sentences like this, programmatic solutions have long been available. One would begin by replacing "I" with a proper name, would add a date, would specify a status with respect to which the speaker was an initiate. A stupendous amount of work has been devoted to such phenomena.

That work is briefly characterized in the following section.

A Characterization of Indexical Expressions

An awareness of indexical expressions occurs not only in the earliest writing but in the work of major authors over the entire history of logic. Every major philosopher has commented on them. Consider for example Peirce and Wittgenstein, Peirce because he is usually cited to mark the beginning of the interest of modern logicians and linguists in indexicals, and Wittgenstein because when his later studies are read to see that he is examining philosopher's talk as indexical phenomena, and is describing these phenomena without thought of remedy, his studies will be found to consist of a sustained, extensive, and penetrating corpus of observations of indexical phenomena.[17]

We borrow from the remarks by logicians and linguists to characterize indexical expressions. Edmund Husserl spoke of expressions (i) whose sense cannot be decided by an auditor without his necessarily knowing or assuming something about the biography and purposes of the user of the expression, the circumstances of the utterance, the previous course of discourse, or the particular relationship of actual or potential interaction that exists between the user and the auditor.[18] (ii) Bertrand Russell pointed out that descriptions involving them apply on each occasion of use to only one thing, but to different things on different occasions.[19] (iii) Such expressions, he said, are used to make unequivocal statements that nevertheless seem to change in truth value. (iv) Nelson Goodman wrote that each of their utterances constitutes a word and refers to a certain person, time, or place

16. William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 16.

17. Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers, Vol. 2* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), paras. 248, 265, 283, 305; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953).

18. Occasional expressions are discussed in Marvin Farber, *Foundation of Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943), pp. 237-238; and C. N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 77-80.

19. Bertrand Russell, *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: Allen, 1940), chap. 7, pp. 102-109.

but names something not named by some replica of the word.[20] (v) Their denotation is relative to the user. (vi) Their use depends upon the relation of the use to the object with which the word is concerned. (vii) For a temporal indexical expression, time is relevant to what it names. (viii) Similarly, just what region a spatial indexical expression names depends upon the location of its utterance. (ix) Indexical expressions and statements containing them are not freely repeatable in a given discourse in that not all their replicas therein are also translations of them.[21]

In their explicit attempts to recover commonplace talk in its structural particulars, logicians and linguists encounter these expressions as obstinate nuisances.[22] The nuisances of indexicals are dramatic wherever inquiries are directed at achieving, for practical talk, the formulation and decidability of alternatives of sense, or fact, or methodic procedure, or agreement among "cultural colleagues." Features of indexical expressions have motivated among professionals endless methodological studies directed to their remedy. Indeed, the work by practitioners to rid the practices of a science, of any science, of these nuisances, because, and in the ways such work occurs in all sciences,[23] furnishes each science its distinctive character of preoccupation and productivity with methodological issues. Whatever the science, actual situations of practical investigative activities afford researchers endless occasions and motives for attempts to remedy indexical expressions. Thus methodological studies, wherever they occur, lay and professional, have been concerned, virtually without exception, with remedying indexical expressions while insistently holding as aims of their studies a programmatically relevant distinction between objective and indexical expressions, and a programmatically relevant substitutability of objective for indexical expressions. In these programmatic studies of the formal properties of natural languages and practical reasoning, the properties of indexicals, while furnishing investigators with motivating occasions for remedial actions, remain obstinately unavoidable and irremediable.

Such "methodological" concerns are not confined to the sciences. One finds ubiquitous concern among conversationalists with faults of natural

20. Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 290ff.

21. A review of indexical expressions is found in Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions," *Mind*, 63 ns (1954), pp. 359-379.

22. Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Philosophical Issues in Artificial Intelligence," Publications in the Humanities, No. 80, Department of Humanities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1967; Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence*, P-3244 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, December, 1965).

23. The reader is asked to read for "all sciences" any inquiries whatsoever that are directed to the detection and assessment of effectiveness of practical activities and to the production of members' accounts of that effectiveness. In addition to the academically taught sciences of the Western world, we include the "ethno" sciences that anthropologists have described, such as ethnomedicine and ethnobotany, as well as the enormous number of empirical disciplines that have their effectiveness in and as practical activities as their abiding phenomenon: Azande witchcraft, Yaqui shamanism, waterwitching, astrology, alchemy, operations research, and the rest.

language. Faults are seen by members to occur in the prevalence of demonstratives, pronouns, and tenses. Faults are assigned to members to usage by others about whom it is said that they have small vocabularies. Such concerns are accompanied by a prevalent recommendation that terms, utterances, and discourse may be clarified, and other shortcomings that consist in the properties of indexical expressions may be remedied by referring them to "their setting" (i.e., the familiar recommendations about the "decisive relevance of context").

More pointedly, we call particular attention to a conversational practice which has frank methodological intent. One finds conversationalists, in the course of a conversation, and as a recognized feature of that conversation, *formulating* their conversation. Formulating, in conversation, is discussed at length in the following sections.

Formulating a Conversation
as a Feature of that Conversation

Among conversationalists it is an immensely commonplace feature of conversations that a conversation exhibits *for its parties* its own familiar features of a "self-explicating colloquy." A member may treat some part of the conversation as an occasion to describe that conversation, to explain it, or characterize it, or explicate, or translate, or summarize, or furnish the gist of it, or take note of its accordance with rules, or remark on its departure from rules. That is to say, a member may use some part of the conversation as an occasion to *formulate* the conversation, as in the following colloquies.

A: Do you think the federal government can go in and try that man for murder?
B: No.
B: It's a matter of state.
A: [Now let me ask you this.]

B: You would not be critical at all.
A: Of Westmoreland.
B: Of the military,—of the—of this recent operation.
A: Of course I'd be critical.
B: [Well, you certainly don't show it!]

JH: Isn't it nice that there's such a crowd of you in the office?
SM: [You're asking us to leave, not telling us to leave, right?]

HG: I need some exhibits of persons evading questions. Will you do me a favor and evade some questions for me?
NW: [Oh, dear, I'm not very good at evading questions.]

(In fatigued excitement a psychiatric resident pauses in telling a supervising faculty member about his discovery of Harry Stack Sullivan's writings.)
Faculty Member: [How long have you been feeling like this?]

Boston policeman to a motorist: [You asked me where Sparks Street is, didn't you? Well, I just told you.]

These excerpts illustrate the point that along with whatever else may be happening in conversation it may be a feature of the conversation for the conversationalists that they are doing something else; namely, what they are doing is saying-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-doing (or what we are talking about, or who is talking, or who we are, or where we are).

We shall speak of conversationalists' practices of saying-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-doing as *formulating*. We shall set off a text with brackets instead of hyphens to designate it as a formulation. In the preceding colloquies the formulating that one of the conversationalists is doing appears in brackets.

Two phenomena are of particular interest for us. (1) We offer as observations about practices of formulating that not only are they done, but they are also recognized by conversationalists as constituent features of the conversation in which they are done. We shall speak of this by saying *that* formulating is being done is, for conversationalists, "exhibited *in* the speaking." (2) We offer the further observation that formulating, as a witnessed feature of conversation, is available to conversationalists' report or comment. To have a way of speaking of this we shall say *that* formulating is done is "exhibitable *for* the telling."

Each of the colloquies provides an example of the first phenomenon. An example of the second phenomenon is found in the fact that we report these colloquies and call attention to the work of formulating being done in each. Brackets are used to designate the following features of formulating:

1. Above all, formulating is an account-able phenomenon. This is to say, (a) it is a phenomenon that members perform, and (b) it is observable by members. (c) In that members can do the phenomenon and observe it, it is reportable.[24] (d) The phenomenon is done and reportable by members.

24. It is not only because members can *do* formulating and *observe* it that formulating is reportable. In that members are *doing* and *observing* formulating being done, it is reportable; or in that members do formulating and observe that it *was* done, it is reportable; or in that members when doing it observe it *will have been done*, it is reportable; in that members when doing it observe it *can have been done*, etc. The criterial consideration is not the availability of "tensed" verbs but the temporal structures of such enterprises. Temporal structures of formulating enterprises include of course the availability to members of time references in natural language.
The clumsiness of sentence structure may be something of a benefit if it earmarks the relevance and availability of the extensive, developed, and deep temporal "parameters" of members doing formulations as accountable enterprises. Particular attention is called to the work that David Sudnow is doing on the temporal parameters of accountable glances.

with texts such as those that are bracketed. (It is done as well with script, utterances, or graphics; that is, with circumstantially particular, notational displays. (e) The bracketed text is a phase of an interactional enterprise. Finally, (f) the text is meaning differently than the speaker can say in so many words.

2. All of the foregoing features are practical accomplishments over the exigencies of actual interaction.

3. The expression, [ ], is prefaced with "doing" in order to emphasize that accountable-conversation-as-a-practical-accomplishment consists only and entirely in and of its work. The prefix "doing" is also used to emphasize that this work of accountable conversation is members' work. That is to say, this work has essential ties to mastery of natural language.

Our illustrations have so far been chosen from laymen's work. The bracketing, and its effects, is relevant as well to the work of social scientists. If we place brackets on topicalized practices in the social sciences with which its practitioners speak of techniques of data collection, of research designs, of descriptive adequacy, of rules of evidence, and the like, we then ask what is the work for which these topics are its accountable texts. For example, linguists speak of "parsing a sentence with the use of phrase markers." By bracketing that text with gloss marks [parsing a sentence with the use of phrase markers], we understand that we are now addressed to the question: What is the work for which "parsing a sentence with the use of phrase markers" is that work's accountable text? The bracketing has similar relevance to the above case as it has to the case where we ask: What is the work for which [playing a game of chess according to the rules of chess] is that work's accountable text?

If we speak of work's accountable text as a proper gloss, we may ask: What is the work for which [speaking without interruption at a cocktail party] is its proper gloss? What is the work for which [the equilibrium size distribution of freely forming groups] is its proper gloss? The following diagram displays these relationships.

"Doing," designates the work for which the notational particulars are its accountable texts.

(The arrows point to these parts in the illustrative expressions.)

doing [playing chess according to the rules]

doing [editing survey schedules to assure their uniformity]

A final remark about brackets: their use reminds us that glossing practices are phases of interactional enterprises. Enterprises of intelligible, particular appearances of organized everyday activities are done unavoidably, only and exclusively by competent speakers, who can do them only and entirely through the particulars of notational displays in natural language. Gloss enterprises are practical accomplishments. They are immensely varied phenomena, for they differ in ways dictated by a world of "social fact," albeit a world of social fact that is members' achievements. As practical achievements, gloss enterprises are as immensely varied as are organizational arrangements, for organizational arrangements are such achievements.

According to occasion, doing formulating may be members' undertakings, aims, rules, obligated behaviors, achievements, passing episodes, or standing circumstances. The work is not restricted to special circumstances. On the contrary, it occurs routinely, and on a massive scale. Members are particularly knowledgeable of, sensitive to, and skillful with this work, with doing it, assuring it, remedying it, and the like.

Doing Accountably Definite Talk

We used the analogy of housewives to characterize the prevalence of and insistence by members upon the work of doing formulations as remedies for the properties of indexical expressions. But, as we have noticed, in that formulations consist of glosses, and in that the properties that formulations exhibit as notational displays—properties that are used by speakers to accomplish rational speech—are properties of indexical expressions, the very resources of natural language assure that doing formulating is itself for members a routine source of complaints, faults, troubles, and recommended remedies, *essentially*. (See pp. 356-357.)

We take the critical phenomenon to consist in this: With ubiquitous prevalence and insistence members do formulations as remedies for problematic features that the properties of indexical expressions present to their attempts to satisfy the aims of distinguishing in actual occasions between objective and indexical expressions, and, in actual occasions, providing objective expressions as substitutes for indexicals. We observe that among members, remedial formulations are overwhelmingly advocated measures to accomplish proper subject matter, proper problems, proper methods, and warranted findings in studying formal structures of practical talk and practical reasoning. We observe that their advocacy of remedial formulations is accompanied by practices with which members are just as overwhelmingly knowledgeable and skilled, practices whereby speakers guarantee and are guaranteed that formulations are *not* the machinery whereby account-

ably sensible, clear, definite talk is done. Such practices are seen in the following phenomena.

1. There are innumerable conversational activities in doing which multitudes of names are available for naming them as conversational phenomena. People know the names; can mention the names, summarize with the names, and so on; and yet in the course of the activities the names are not much used. Indeed, a commonplace but little understood phenomenon consists of cases where in doing [saying in so many words what one is doing] the activity is recognizedly incongruous, or boring, or furnishes evidence of incompetence, of devious motivation, and so forth.

2. There is a tremendous topical coherence in ordinary conversations, and yet conversationalists' formulation of topics is a very special thing. It is rarely done. In any particular case it is not only probably but perhaps irremediably disputable, and though one gets talk that is topical, topical names are not inserted.

3. It occurs as a commonplace achievement in ordinary conversations—which for conversationalists furnishes commonplace evidence of conversational competence—that conversationalists title relevant texts, search for, remember, recognize, or offer relevant texts without those texts being topicalized, where success in so doing depends upon vagueness of topic, aim, rule of search, rule of relevance, and the rest, and where the work of storage and retrieval of relevant texts incorporates this vagueness as an essential feature in its design.

4. Another phenomenon was described in a previous study.[25] Students were asked to write what the parties to an ordinary conversation were overheard to have said, and then to write alongside what the parties actually were talking about. The students, having been set the task of saying in just so many words what the parties were actually talking about, immediately saw that the work of satisfying the task hopelessly elaborated the task's features. Somehow they saw immediately that the very task that had been set—"Tell me as if I don't know, what the parties were literally talking about"—was faulted, not in the sense that the author would not know, or could not or would not understand, or that there was not enough time or paper or stamina or vocabulary in English for a writer to tell it, but that:

... I had required them to take on the impossible task of "repairing" the essential incompleteness of *any* set instructions no matter how carefully or elaborately written they might be. I had required them to formulate the method that the parties had used in speaking, as rules of procedure to follow in order to say what the parties said, rules that would withstand every exigency of situation, imagination, and development . . . . [This was the task] that required them

25. Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology*, pp. 29-30.

to write "more," that they found increasingly difficult and finally impossible, and that became elaborated in its features by the very procedures for doing it.

We take as the critical import of these phenomena that they furnish specifics for the observation that *for the member it is not in the work of doing formulations for conversation that the member is doing [the fact that our conversational activities are accountably rational].* The two activities are neither identical nor interchangeable.

We notice also that doing formulating is "occasioned." By this we mean that cited times, places, and personnel whereby formulating is done—that concrete, definite, clear, determinate specifications of where? when? who? what? how many?—are unavoidably and without remedy done as accountable phenomena. Also, it is not only that members may use particular rules to provide for the occasioned character of a formulation, but the failure to use particular rules is usable by a member to find what it is that formulating is doing in a conversation, where the fact of formulating does not mean to those doing it that doing it is definitive of its work; but instead doing it can be found to be joking, or being obstinate, and the like.

In short, doing formulating for conversation itself exhibits for conversationalists an orientation to [the fact that our conversational activities are accountably rational]. Doing formulating is not the definitive means whereby the fact is itself done or established. The question of what one who is doing formulating is doing—which is a member's question—is not solved by formulating is doing—which is a member's question—is not solved by members by consulting what the formulation proposes, but by engaging in practices that make up the *essentially* contexted character of the action of formulating. Even the briefest consideration of doing formulating in conversation returns us—naïve speaker or accomplished social scientist—to the phenomenon in conversation of doing [the fact that our conversational activities are accountably rational].

What are we proposing when we propose that the question of what one is doing who is doing formulating is solved by members by engaging in practices that make up the *essentially* contexted character of the action of formulating? What kind of work is it for which [the fact that our conversational activities are accountably rational] is its proper gloss?

Formal Structures in Accountably Rational Discourse:
The "Machinery"

We learn to ask from the work of conversationalists: What kind of "machinery" makes up the practices of doing [accountably rational conversation]? Are there practices for doing and recognizing [the fact that our activities are accountably rational] without, for example, making a formulation of the setting that the practices are "contexted" in? What is the work

for which [the fact that our activities are accountably rational] is an accountable text? What is the work for which [definiteness, univocality, disambiguation, and uniqueness of conversational particulars is assured by conversationalists' competence with speech in context] is a proper gloss?

We ask such questions because we learn from the phenomena that are problematic for conversationalists that "time," "place," or "personnel," for example, with which conversationalists say in so many words who, or where, or when, or since when, or how long since, or how much more, or with whom, or what, are contexted phenomena. More accurately, they are *essentially* contexted phenomena.

By "contexted phenomena" we mean that there exist specific practices such that (1) they make up what a member is doing when he does and recognizes [the fact of relevant time, place, or personnel]; (2) they are done with or without formulating *which* now, or where, or with whom, or since when, or how much longer, and the like; (3) they make up members' work for which [practices of objective, clear, consistent, cogent—rational—language] is a proper gloss; and (4) they meet the first three criteria by satisfying the following constraints (to which we refer with the adjective *essential*).

1. They are cause for members' complaints; they are faulted; they are nuisances; troubles; proper grounds for corrective, that is, remedial, action.

2. They are without remedy in the sense that every measure that is taken to achieve a remedy preserves in specifics the features for which the remedy was sought.

3. They are unavoidable; they are inescapable; there is no hiding place from their use, no moratorium, no time out, no room in the world for relief.

4. Programmatic ideals characterized their workings.

5. These ideals are available as "plain spoken rules" to provide accounts of adequate description for all practical purposes, or adequate explanation. adequate identity, adequate characterization, adequate translation. adequate analysis and so forth.

6. Provision is made "in studies by practicing logicians" for each ideal's "poor relatives," as indexical expressions are the poor relatives of objective expressions; as commonsense knowledge is a poor relative of scientific knowledge; as natives' practices and natives' knowledge are poor relatives of professional practices and professional knowledge of natives' affairs, practices, and knowledge; as Calvin N. Mooers's descriptors are poor relatives of sets, categories, classes, or collections in formal logic; or, as formal structures in natural language are poor relatives of formal structures in invented languages. For "poor relatives" we understand "embarrassing but necessary nuisances," "lesser versions," "nonphenomena," "no causes for celebration," "ugly doubles" that are relied on by members to assure the claims of the relatives that went to college and came back

educated. Ideals are not the monopoly of academies, and neither are their poor relatives confined to the streets. Always in each others' company, they are available in immense varieties for they are as common as talk. Being theorized out of existence by members' ironic contrast between commonsense knowledge and scientific knowledge, they are also difficult to locate and report with the use of that contrast.

7. Members are unanimous in their recognition of the foregoing six characteristics of specific practices; they are also unanimous in their use of these characteristics to detect, sense, identify, locate, name—that is, to formulate—one or another "sense" of practical activities as an "invariant structure of appearances."

Speaking practices, insofar as they satisfy such constraints, are inescapably tied to particulars of talk, and thus speaking practices are inexorably exhibited and witnessed as ordered particulars of talk. Insofar as they satisfy such constraints, speaking practices also exhibit the features of "production cohort independence," or "invariant to in and out migrations of system personnel," or "invariant to transformations of context," or "universals." They exhibit features of invariance by providing members' methods with which particulars are recovered, produced, identified, and recognized as connected particulars; as particulars in relationships of entailment, relevance, inference, allusion, reference, evidence; which is to say as collections of particulars, or classes, or sets, or families, or groups, or swarms.

Members use these constraints to detect various ways of doing [invariance] in members' practices. Because members do so, we shall use them in the same way, namely, as constraints that speaking practices must satisfy if we are to count those practices as members' resources for doing and recognizing [rational adequacy for practical purposes of natural language]. They provide characteristics of the practices with which members accomplish and recognize rational discourse in its indexical particulars, namely, 'practical talk.'

What are those practices?[26] We learn some if we ask about a *list* of indexical expressions how long the list might be. To answer this question we need a procedure that will get us a list of indexical terms. Such a procedure is easily available, for we notice that any "one" of the properties of indexical expressions cited on pp. 348-349, and any combination of them, may be read as a prescription with which to search an *actual* occasion of discourse, an *actual* utterance, or an *actual* text.

26. Because we are required to learn what these practices are by consulting members, we must require of the methods that we use to locate these practices, and of the practices that such methods locate that they satisfy the same constraints. The argument to justify this assertion and to show that the method we use is adequate with respect to these requirements are detailed in Harold Garfinkel, "Practices and Structures of Practical Sociological Reasoning and Methods for their Elucidation," in *Contributions to Ethnomethodology*.

When this is done, we observe the following. Any actual occasion may be searched for indexical terms, and will furnish indexical terms. Whatever is the number of terms in an actual text, that text will furnish members.[27] An actual occasion with *no* text will furnish members. Any member of the list of indexical terms can be used as a prescription to locate replicas. Listing any replica of a member of the list is an adequate procedure for locating another member. Any procedure for finding *a* member is adequate for finding for *all* terms of a language that they are members, which includes "all"—which is to say that in finding for all terms of a language that they are members we are exploring and using the members' use of "all." "A one," "any one," and "all" lists of indexical terms exhibit the same properties as the particular members of "a one," "any one," and "all" lists. Any text without exception that is searched with the use of any one or combination of *properties* from a list of indexical terms will furnish members to the list. Any text without exception that is searched with the use of one or combination of terms from a list of indexical terms will furnish members to the list. Any list of indexical terms can be indefinitely extended, as can any list of properties of indexical terms. Every procedure for finding more members and adding them to the list of properties exhibits the same properties as the members it finds. Every list of properties of indexical expressions can be extended indefinitely. Whatever holds above for "terms" holds equally for "expressions" and "utterances." Finally, the preceding properties remain invariant to such operations as search for, recognition of, collection, counting, forming sentences with, translating, identifying, or performing consistency proofs or computations upon list members.

Consequences

We have seen that and how members do [the fact that our activities are accountably rational]. We have seen that the work is done without having to do formulations; that the terms which have to be clarified are not to be replaced by formulations that would not do what they do; that they are organizable as a "machinery" for doing [accountably rational activities]; and that the abstract phenomenon of [accountable rationality] is available to natives, to ethnomethodologists, and to social scientists since the "machinery," because it is members' "machinery," in the way it is specifically used to do [accountably rational activities] is thereby part of the phenomenon as its production and recognition apparatus. We have given that some structure, and tried to exhibit both the obviousness of it, and its enormous interest and pervasiveness for members.

27. *Members* of the list has the conventional meaning of *items* of the list.

1. It seems that there is no room in the world definitively to propose formulations of activities, identifications, and contexts. Persons cannot be nonconsequentially, nonmethodically, nonalternatively involved in doing [saying in so many words what we are doing]. They cannot be engaged in nonconsequentially, nonmethodically, nonalternatively saying, for example, "This is after all a group therapy session," or "With respect to managerial roles, the size and complexity of organizations is increasing and hence the requirements necessary for their successful management also."

The fact that there is no room in the world for formulations as serious solutions to the problem of social order has to do with the prevailing recommendation in the social sciences that formulations can be done for practical purposes to accomplish empirical description, or to achieve the justification and test of hypotheses, and the rest. Formulations are recommended thereby as resources with which the social sciences may accomplish rigorous analyses of practical actions that are adequate for all practical purposes.

We are *not* saying that it is a specific trouble in the world that one cannot find out what somebody means—what any given person means in any next thing they say or meant in any last thing they said—by using a procedure of requesting a formulation for each piece of talk. But we *are* saying that insofar as formulations are recommended to be definitive of "meaningful talk," something is amiss because "meaningful talk" cannot have that sense. This is to say either that talk is not meaningful unless we construct a language which is subject to such procedures, or that *that* could not be what "meaningful talk" is, or "meaningful actions" either. We *are* saying that we ought not to suppose that in order for persons in the course of their conversations and other ordinary activities to behave in an orderly fashion, one set of things that has to be involved is that they are always able, say, to formulate their role relationships and systematically invoke their consequences. For if it is the case that there is no room in the world for that, then either orderly activity is impossible, or *that* requirement for orderly activity is in any actual case relevant, irrelevant, cogent, absurd, wrong, right, etc.—that requirement being formulatable in any actual case as any of these or others, separately or combined, for no more than for all practical purposes.

2. We took notice initially of the notion that formulating could save the difficulties with indexicals.[28] We saw that formulating could not do that and, furthermore, that indexicals would not need saving from difficulties. We have seen that the allegedly to-be-remedied features of terms are omnipervasive. And so one must entertain the fact that *none* of them needs saving.

3. Professional sociology's achievement is to have formulated rational

28. We take notice of how practices of practical sociological reasoning seek to remedy the indexical properties of talk: they seek essentially to do so.

accountability of social structures of practical activities as precepts of constructive analysis. The social structures of everyday activities, as we remarked before, are understood by the formulations of constructive analysis to consist of such properties as uniformity, social standardization, repetition, reproducibility, typicality, categorizability, reportability of ordinary conduct, of talk, of territorial distributions, of beliefs about one thing or another that are invariant to changes of production cohorts. The practical technology of constructive analytic theorizing is available, in apotheosis, in the work of Parsons, Lazarsfeld, and RAND techniques of systems analysis. We observe that its practitioners insist that the practices of constructive analysis are *members'* achievements. We learn from practitioners that, and how, adequate application of its precepts to demonstrations of formal structures in actual occasions demands members' competence. We observe, too, that particulars in procedures and results of constructive analysis furnish to members perspicuous exhibits of vaguely known "settings." [29] In every actual occasion of their use, particulars in procedures and particulars in results provide members with the combination of unavoidable, irremediable vagueness with equally unavoidable, irremediable relevance. From practitioners we understand that the combination of essential vagueness and relevance is available to members only, for members' production, evaluation, and recognition. In short, we learn from practitioners of constructive analysis that our findings about formulating are extendable to constructive analysis.

Formulating does not extend to constructive analysis as its gloss, nor is formulating a generalization of the experience of analysis. Least of all is formulating a generalization of the practices of professional sociologists. It is extendable in the ways that doing [constructive analysis] is what *members* do; like [saying specifically in so many words just what we are doing], or [saying what is meant and meaning what is said in a few well-chosen words], or [removing from cell titles the nuisances of indexical expressions], or [mapping the system of real numbers on collections of indexical expressions], or [abstracting methodological paradigms from the work of E.S.R.] or [thinking sequentially]. Because doing [constructive analysis] is what members do, what we observe about formulating is observed as well in the practices of professional sociologists doing [constructive analysis]. In that work we see *members* being careful to build context-free descriptions, relevant instructions, perspicuous anecdotes, cogent proverbs, precise definitions of ordinary activities, and context-free formalizations of natural language practices, and using members' competence with natural language practices to assure the doing and recognition of [adequate evidence]. [objective description], [definite procedure], [clear, consistent, co-

29. We have borrowed from remarks made by Hubert L. Dreyfus about Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty during his informal seminar at Harvard University in March, 1968.

gent, relevant instructions], [computable conversations], and the rest. In that work we see professional sociologists' insistence on members' competence to assure these glosses as concerted accomplishments.

The machinery of professionals' gloss achievements is described only in barest part by the practices that were described in a preceding section as members' machinery for doing [rational talk for practical purposes]. How such glosses are done has not been elucidated beyond ethnographic remarks furnished by sociological practitioners, both lay and professional. What various kinds of enterprises, such as [objective sociological formulations], [definite instructions], and the like, are as conversational accomplishments is not known.

4. From an inspection of the work of constructive analysis we learn that rational accountability of everyday activities as practical accomplishments is accounted by members to consist of the practices of constructive analysis. From that work we learn, too, that such accounts are themselves warranted features of that practical accomplishment. From their practices we learn that formal structures in the practices of constructive analysis, which, in the sense described in an earlier section of this paper ("Ethnomethodology's Interest in Formal Structures of Practical Actions") *are formal structures in members' natural language practices*, are *not* available to the methods of constructive analysis. We are not proposing an "impossibility" argument in the sense of a logical proof, nor are we offering an in-principle account of constructive analysis. Nor are we recommending an attitude toward, a position on, or an approach to constructive analysis. Nor are we saying that formal structures are not available to constructive analysis because of trained incapacity, habitual preferences, vested interests, and the like. Most emphatically, we are not offering advice, praise, or criticism.

Instead, we are taking notice of that unavailability as a phenomenon. We offer the observation about that unavailability that it is invariant to the practices of constructive analysis. This is not to say that the phenomenon somehow defies the efforts of constructive analysis. The unavailability of formal structures is assured by the practices of constructive analysis for it *consists of* its practices. The unavailability of formal structures is an invariant feature of every actual occasion of constructive analysis, without exception, without time out, without relief or remedy, no actual occasion being excepted no matter how transient or enduring, the unavailability being reportable, assured, done, and recognized not only unanimously, but with required unanimity by whoever does sociology—or, equivalently, by whoever knows how to talk.

That formal structures in members' natural language practices are not available to the methods of constructive analysis establishes the study of practical sociological reasoning. Ethnomethodological studies have been using that unavailability to locate one or another "piece" of construc-

tive analysis and bring under scrutiny how its achievement is an account-able phenomenon for members. The availability of these studies establishes the *de facto* existence of an alternative to the other prospects and perspectives in this volume, for although formal structures of constructive analysis are not available to constructive analysis, they are not otherwise unavailable; they are available to ethnomethodology. That this is so is less interesting than the question of whether they are available to ethnomethodology uniquely.

Appendix: Notes on Glossing

The following are examples of different methods for doing observable-reportable understanding, i.e., account-able understanding. They were selected from a collection of reports of ordinary occasions in which persons who, in the same ways that they recognize or understand each other as knowing how to speak, are engaged in concertedly meaning differently than they can say in just so many words.

The examples are intended to specify "glossing practices" as a topic. The foregoing definition is used as a weak rule to serve our interests of extending and organizing the collection: of search, detection, exclusion, titling, and so on. Is it to be read as a weak rule for the time being? It occurred to us, of course, that a more exact definition is an aim in collecting them. That aim is familiar to those who want their studies of natural language to be taken seriously. Of course we, too, entertain such an aim; but where glosses are concerned we do not entertain it too seriously because we learn when glosses are being studied, and from what we learn about glossing practices, that such an aim is not interesting. It *is* interesting, rather, that that aim cannot be satisfied. We shall see this from some of the examples. Further, *that* a weak definition is used to formulate as a goal a strong definition aimed at by the use of a weak definition, and for the accomplishment of which the weak definition is a resource, is another hope that cannot be satisfied. Or better, it is a hope that is satisfied in this way: One acquires a skill that counts as a recognized mastery of natural language. And that, too, is interesting. Further features are provided by particular and definite ways that that aim cannot be satisfied, and seem to add up to this: Definiteness of glossing practices is available to study, irrespective of whether definitions are lacking, are weak, loose, etc. We find that to be a repeating "logical" feature. We are fascinated by it, and are seeking it out wherever we can.

Perhaps glossing practices can be person-specific. We are undecided. In any case, the examples were selected to illustrate several differing ways in which their production is organized as a concerted, practical accomplishment. For example, Richards' gloss consists of a method whereby yet-to-be-

comprehended texts are glossed over unknown ways of arriving at definite sense, where no account of a way of arriving at whatever definite sense the process comes to is called for by those doing it, or needs to be provided by them. Two variations on this thematic characteristic are provided in the case of mock-ups, and where definitions are used in first approximation to stronger ones.

Mock-ups. It is possible to buy a plastic engine that will tell something about how auto engines work. The plastic engine preserves certain properties of the auto engine. For example, it will show how the pistons move with respect to the crankshaft; how they are timed to a firing sequence, and so on. As we shall see, it is interesting and relevant that to make the pistons work the user has to turn the flywheel with his finger.

Let us call that plastic engine an account of an observable state of affairs. We offer the following observations of that account's features. First, in the very way that it provides for an accurate representation of features in the actual situation, and in the very way it provides for an accurate representation of *some* relationships and *some* features in the observable situation, it also makes specifically and deliberately false provision for some of the *essential* features of that situation. Second, in making this deliberately false provision it provides that the deliberately false provisions must be there if the account is to be treated as an account of that situation. Third, by reason of this false provision, the account is said by the user of the account to "resemble" the situation he wants to use it to represent. Fourth, the knowledge of the ways in which the account—the plastic engine—makes false provision is for the user a controlling consideration in permitting it to be used as an account of the actual situation. Fifth, the mock-up—the plastic engine—in the entirety of its particular, actual features, whatever they are, and for whatever uses they might be used, is understood throughout by the user to have the status of a guide to practical actions in the actual situation, whatever it may consist of in an actual occasion, when the user must come to terms with an actual engine. Sixth, this intended use is exclusively the matter of the user's choice when deciding for himself the adequacy of the mock-up and the mock-up's correct use. Finally, its use is accompanied by the user's willingness, whenever he might encounter a feature in the actual situation that the mock-up falsely provides for, to pay full authority to the actual situation, and to let the mock-up stand without the necessary impulse of having to correct it.

A definition used in first approximation resembles Richards' gloss and mock-ups in that it furnishes still another way to accomplish recognized definiteness of talk without ever specifying how that definiteness is achieved.

Definitions used in first approximation occur in articles where an author at the beginning of an article may furnish a definition which he accompanies with the request that its looseness be forgiven for the time being, that (for whatever reasons) he will not define it more closely then and

there, but if the reader will permit its provisional character he will proceed with his arguments and at a later point provide a second definition which can then be substituted.

The following example of such a definition adds still another feature. It was chosen because it provides the reader an exhibit in which definiteness of talk is achieved, although how definiteness of talk is done is essentially unspecifiable.

Consider the following as a definition in first approximation of "glossing."

I want to speak about persons who know how to talk—speakers of a language—engaged in multitudinous practices of meaning differently than they can say in so many words over actual occasions of interaction. I want to collect their practices with the term *glossing*. I want to use this definition for the time being as a rule with which, to locate relevant actual occasions that might be searched for exhibits, and with which exhibits might be compared, described, grouped, titled, captioned, and so on. A more exact definition will be treated as the aim of our inquiries. As we come, in the course of our collecting enterprise, to learn more about what I am using the term *glossing* to speak about, and as we are able to furnish the matter of our concern with greater definiteness, we shall rewrite the definition so as to formulate from the exhibits, and from the reflections that they motivate, their essential features and the essential connections between those features.

When, with the use of this definition, actual occasions are examined in the search for possible exhibits, the definition is used to an indefinitely specified depth of self-embeddedness. We notice, too, that no antinomies block or stifle its sense; nor are we confounded by the "depth" of its recursiveness.

Anthropological quotes. An anthropologist returns from the field with his notebooks to the company of professional colleagues. Having spent time in the field, he has the task of turning his texts into a professionally acceptable report. For example, Manning Nash[30] reminds graduate students in his seminars about the tandem features of criticism and field work. One day, each one in his turn will return from a strange society and will have to report his findings in coherent, declarative sentences. The anthropologist is going to have to write in detail what he learned from the natives to whom he is likely to have been a stranger in the critical sense that for months, and perhaps for his entire stay, their language was apt not to have been under his control. He need give no account of how his field notes were collected. Only rarely do anthropologists connect their notes and how they were collected, expanded, analyzed, revised, and otherwise used, with their field circumstances as constituent features of those

30. Personal communication.

circumstances. Even less frequently do they report how the notes were turned into a report intended to be read by all—by writer and by colleagues—with respect to such circumstances of professional work that the use of anthropological quotes is an interesting and relevant glossing practice.

The procedure of reporting in anthropological quotes is as follows. The anthropologist proceeds to rewrite the texts as a report using a procedure that he calls "writing." A prevailing task that is done by writing is to propose an account of what his natives, in the language *they* talked, will be treated as actually and not supposedly having been talking about, given that the anthropologist cannot and will not say finally and in only so many words what they were really talking about. In this fashion he reports to colleagues that *they* talked in this way, definitely. So, for example, he cites the natives in their native terms and treats those terms with the device of a "glossary." That is to say, he recommends to colleagues that *he* will mean by *his* translations of natives' terms what the natives were really talking about, that he will treat the natives and their practices as final authority for, although what those might consist of beyond what he has written, he cannot say and says that the writer elects to be cautious in specifying what the native really means, given that the writer means what the native really means, "what the native really means," which is incorporated into the report as the professional's paraphrase of native informants' reportage, is glossed over the report as it is available in an actual occasion through work of professionally unspecified methods of authorship and readership.

As far as professionals are concerned, practices of anthropological glossing provide anthropologists with practices and circumstances that distinguish them-from other professionals. The professional association consists of the availability of competent readers and unexplicated circumstances over which that kind of writing gets glossed. Via association membership, definiteness of sense and facticity of the report are intimately tied to conversational settings, conversation devices, conversational "machinery" in which, and wherewith what is actually and not supposedly reported will have been "seen for the saying" to have been written in so many words.

Certifying an event that you did not bid for illustrates a practice whereby a definiteness is discovered within a conversational schedule, the point of interest being that definiteness is discovered by exploiting the differences between time ordering in the event's production and the accountable time ordering of the produced event. The practice is as follows. You are conversing with another person. The person laughs. You are momentarily surprised, for you had not meant to make a joke. In that you hear the person laugh, you smile so as to assign to the other person's laugh its feature that

his laugh detected your wit, but you conceal the fact that the other person, when he laughed, furnished you an opportunity to "claim a credit" you did not seek.

Rose's gloss. Professor Edward Rose, a colleague at the University of Colorado, reports a practice that makes deliberate use of the property that definiteness of circumstantial particulars *consists* of their consequences. He uses that property as follows, to find out definitely what he *has* been doing.

On a visit to a city he has never seen before, Rose is met at the airport by his host. They are driving home when Rose [looks] out the window—which is to say that Rose, after doing [looking ahead] then does [watching something go by] by turning his head to accord with the passage of the auto. Rose's problem is to get his partner to provide him with what he has been looking at. Doing the notable particulars [looking ahead] and [watching something go by] and their serial arrangement are the crux of the matter, and make up Rose's artfulness. Continuing to do [looking out the window] Rose remarks, "It certainly has changed." His host may say something like. "It was ten years before they rebuilt the block after the fire." Rose, by having said, "It certainly has changed," finds in the reply, and with the use of the reply, what he, Rose, was talking about in the first place. Picking that up he formulates further the concerted, sensible matter that the two parties are making happen as the recognizable, actual, plainly heard specifics in a course of conversation: "You don't say. What did it cost?"

14.
Deviance and Order in a Pluralistic Society

Jack D. Douglas

Jack D. Douglas was born in Miami, Florida, in 1937 and attended Harvard (B.A.) and Princeton (Ph.D.). He is now an associate professor of sociology at the University of California, San Diego. Most of his work has been in the areas of theory and methods, deviance, criminology, urban social problems, and the sociology of sciences (especially of the social sciences). His most important published work to date is The Social Meanings of Suicide.