

## Lecture 9: October 22, 2001

### ◆ El Gamal PKCS

### ◆ Signatures:

- RSA
- El Gamal
- DSS

### ◆ HW1 due today

### ◆ Midterm: Wednesday (October 24)

## El Gamal and Discrete Logs

### The discrete logarithm problem in $Z_p$ (where $p$ - large prime, at least 512 bits)

*Eve knows:*

$p, b, y$

$p$  - prime

$b \in Z_p^*$  - generator, base

$y \in Z_p^*$  - query element

FIND  $x \in [0, p-2] \ni b^x \equiv y \pmod{p}$

Factoids:

- no known poly algorithms
- basis for many crypto methods
- conjectured to be a good OWF; why?

## El Gamal PK cryptosystem (83)

$p$  – large prime

$b$  – base, primitive element, generator

$x$  – private exponent

$y$  – public residue;  $y \equiv b^x \pmod{p}$

$P = Z_p^*$

$C = Z_p^* \times Z_p^*$

publics :  $p, b, y$

secrets :  $x$

*Encryption :*

1. generate random  $r \in Z_{p-1}$

2. compute :  $k = b^r \pmod{p}$

3. compute :  $c = my^r \pmod{p} = mb^{xr} \pmod{p}$

4. ciphertext =  $\{k, c\}$

*Decryption :*

1. compute  $k^x \pmod{p}$

2. compute  $(k^x)^{-1} \pmod{p}$

3.  $m' = (k^x)^{-1} c = b^{-rx} mb^{xr} \pmod{p} = m$

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## El Gamal (example)

$p = 13, b = 2, x = 9$

$y = 2^9 \pmod{13} = 5$

*Encryption :*

$m = 11$

$r = 10$

$k = 2^{10} \pmod{13} = 10$

$c = 11 * 5^{10} \pmod{13} = 2$

ciphertext =  $\{10, 2\}$

*Decryption :*

$10^9 \pmod{13} = 12$

$12^{-1} \pmod{13} = 12$

$2 * 12 = 24 \equiv 11 \pmod{13}$

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# Merkle-Hellman Knapsack PKCS

Both are NP-c

Subset sum decision problem

Subset sum search problem

$S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$  – sizes  
 $T$  – target sum

Does there exist a binary vector  
 $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$   
such that:  
 $\sum S \times X = T$

$S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$  – sizes  
 $T$  – target sum

Compute a binary vector  
 $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$   
such that:  
 $\sum S \times X = T$

$S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$   
superincreasing  
iff  $\forall i$   
 $s_i > s_1 + \dots + s_{i-1}$

→ Trivial to solve...

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# Merkle-Hellman (contd)

$S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$  – sizes (superincreasing)  
 $p$  – prime,  $p > \sum S$   
 $a < p$   
 $C = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$   
 $c_i = as_i \bmod p$

publics:  $C$   
secrets:  $p, a, S$

Encryption:  
cleartext  $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$   
 $e_k(X) = \sum XC$


Decryption:  
ciphertext  $Y$   
1.  $T = a^{-1}Y \bmod p$   
2. solve SSP for  $S, T \rightarrow X$

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## Digital Signatures



- Integrity
- Authentication
- Non-repudiation
- Timestamping
- Causality
- Authorization

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## Digital Signatures

**A signature scheme:**

***(P,A,K,Sign,Verify)***

***P*** - plaintext (msgs)

***A*** - signatures

***K*** - keys

***Sign*** - signing function:  $(P * \underline{K}) \rightarrow A$

***Verify*** - verification function:  $(P * A * K) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

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## RSA Signature Scheme

Let  $n = pq$  where  $p \neq q$  - (large) primes

$e, d \in_R Z_n$  and  $e = d^{-1}$  and  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\Phi(n)}$

$\Phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$

Secrets:  $p, q, d$

Publics:  $n, e$

Signing: message =  $m$

$\text{Sign}(x): y = m^d \pmod{n}$

Verification: signature =  $y$

$\text{Verify}(y, m): (m = y^e) ???$

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## RSA Signature Scheme (contd)

The good:

- Verification can be made cheap
- Same as decryption function
- Security based on RSA encryption
- Signing is harder but #verify-s > 1...
- Deterministic

The bad:

- Recall that RSA is malleable: signatures can be "massaged"
- Phony "random" signatures
  - compute  $Y = \text{RSA}(e, X) = X^e \pmod{n}$
  - $X$  is a signature of  $Y$  because  $Y^d = X \pmod{n}$

The ugly:

- Signing requires integrity!
- How to sign multiple blocks?
- Deterministic

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## El Gamal Signature Scheme

$p$  - large prime  
 $b$  - base, generator  
 $x$  - private exponent  
 $y$  - public residue ;  $y \equiv b^x \pmod{p}$   
 $P = Z_p^*$   
 $A = Z_p^* \times Z_p^*$   
publics :  $p, b, y$   
secrets :  $x$

Signing :

1. generate random  $r \in Z_{p-1}$
2. compute :  $k = b^r \pmod{p}$
3. compute :  $c = (m - xk)r^{-1} \pmod{p-1}$
4. signatur  $e = \{k, c\}$

Verifying :

$$y^k k^c \pmod{p} = b^m \pmod{p} \quad ???$$

notice that :

$$y^k k^c = b^{xb^r} (b^r)^{(m/r - xk/r)} = b^{xb^r + m - xb^r} = b^m$$