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 2
 3 **Notarized federated ID management**
 4 **and authentication** *
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14
 15 We propose a *notarized* federated identity management model that supports efficient user authentication 15
 16 when providers are unknown to each other. Our model introduces a notary service, owned by a trusted 16
 17 third-party, to dynamically notarize assertions generated by identity providers. An additional feature of 17
 18 our model is the avoidance of direct communications between identity providers and service providers, 18
 19 which provides improved privacy protection for users. We present an efficient implementation of our 19
 20 notarized federated identity management model based on the Secure Transaction Management System 20
 21 (STMS). We also give a practical solution for mitigating aspects of the identity theft problem and discuss 21
 22 its use in our notarized federated identity management model. The unique feature of our cryptographic 22
 23 solution is that it enables one to proactively prevent the leaking of secret identity information. 23

24 Keywords: Federated identity management, notarization, SAML, identity management, identity-based 24
 25 encryption 25

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 27
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 29 **1. Introduction** 29

30
 31 Digital identity management is becoming an integral part of our lives, as con- 31
 32 sumers and businesses rely more and more on online transactions for daily tasks, 32
 33 such as banking, shopping, and bill payment. These transactions crucially depend on 33
 34 networked computer systems to communicate sensitive identity data across personal, 34
 35 company and enterprise boundaries. 35

36 Unfortunately, the overuse of personal information in online transactions opens the 36
 37 door to identity theft, which poses a serious threat to personal finances and credit rat- 37
 38 ings of users and creates liabilities for corporations. Moreover, the increasing dangers 38

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1 of identity theft are negatively affecting people's collective confidence on the digital 1
2 world for online financial transactions [13]. Thus, effective solutions for managing 2
3 digital identity on both the individual and enterprise levels are urgently needed. 3

4 Additionally, end users are challenged with increasing numbers of websites that 4
5 require access control and authentication. Studies show that users resort to using 5
6 weak passwords or writing them down to alleviate the burden of memorizing mul- 6
7 tiple passwords. One well-known identity management solution that deals with this 7
8 issue is the *single sign-on (SSO)* technique, which requires the user to authenticate 8
9 only once to a website, and then automatically authenticates the user to other web- 9
10 sites from then on, within a session. 10

11 The approach based on cryptographic-enabled assertions is embodied by the *Se-* 11
12 *curity Assertion Markup Language (SAML)* [10]. SAML 2.0 is generally believed 12
13 to support general cross-domain authentication and SAML is quickly becoming the 13
14 *de-facto* means for exchanging user credentials between trusted environments. The 14
15 identity federation architecture of *Liberty Alliance* is compliant with the SAML 2.0 15
16 standard [16]. Indeed, SAML is specifically designed to support cross domain single 16
17 sign-on, which is illustrated in the following example. 17

18 A user has a secure logon session to a website (e.g., *Airline.com*) and is accessing 18
19 resources on that site. *Airline.com* serves as the *identity provider* site. At some point 19
20 in the session, the user is directed to another web site in a different DNS domain 20
21 for a related service, and this outside domain is called the *service provider* site (e.g., 21
22 *CarRental.com*). The identity provider (*Airline.com*) asserts to the service provider 22
23 (*CarRental.com*) that the user is known to the identity provider and gives to the ser- 23
24 vice provide the user's name and session attributes (e.g., *Gold member*). Since the 24
25 service provider trusts the assertions generated by the identity provider, it creates a 25
26 session for the user based on the information received. The user is not required to 26
27 authenticate again when directed to the service provider site. Hence, single sign-on 27
28 is achieved. 28

29 The *identity provider (IdP)* in SAML [10] is defined as the system, or administra- 29
30 tive domain, that asserts information about a subject. An identity provider asserts that 30
31 a user has been authenticated and has certain attributes. The *service provider (SP)* 31
32 is defined as the system, or administrative domain, that relies on the information 32
33 supplied to it by the identity provider. 33
34 34

35 1.1. Motivation for notarized ID federation 35

36 36
37 In existing federated identity management systems that support SAML, such as 37
38 the *Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF)* [11] and *WS-Federation* [27], 38
39 it is up to the service provider to decide whether it trusts the assertions provided to 39
40 it. Service providers in SAML are also known as *relying parties* due to the fact that 40
41 they rely on the information provided by an identity provider. This reliance implies 41
42 that websites of different administrative domains need to trust each other's access 42
43 control verdicts on end users. In fact, SAML single sign-on relies on the concept 43

1 of *identity federation* in order for it to work at all. An identity federation is said to 1
2 exist between an identity provider and a service provider, when the service provider 2
3 accepts assertions regarding a user from the identity provider [10]. 3

4 Efficiently maintaining a federated identity infrastructure is important, especially 4
5 when member domains in the federation dynamically join or leave. Effectively dis- 5
6 seminating membership information in the federation is crucial, as service providers 6
7 rely on this information for making access control decisions. These access control 7
8 decisions directly protect the security of the resources of the service provider and 8
9 have to be made with high assurance. Because the role of service providers and 9
10 identity providers are sometimes inter-changeable in web services, all participating 10
11 domains in federated identity management systems must face the trust decisions im- 11
12 plied by all possible cross-domain interactions. 12

13 In fact, most existing SSO solutions assume preexisting trust relationship among 13
14 providers and do not provide concrete mechanisms for the trust establishment be- 14
15 tween providers. The WS-Federation specification [27] discusses several trust rela- 15
16 tionships between identity providers and service providers, including directed trust, 16
17 indirected brokered trust, and chained trust. However, details on how the trust rela- 17
18 tionships and identity brokers can be instantiated are not given. This limitation hin- 18
19 ders the wide deployment of SSO in web-service environments, because providers 19
20 may be unknown to each other. Therefore, flexible, reliable and secure trust estab- 20
21 lishment mechanisms need to be provided for federated identity management. 21
22

23 1.2. Our contributions 23

24
25 In this paper, we present a notarized federated identity management protocol that 25
26 supports flexible and efficient authentication of assertions, and enables a service 26
27 provider to proactively obtain the trustworthiness information of unknown identity 27
28 providers. 28

29 We also address important aspects of the problem of large-scale identity theft. In 29
30 June 2005, CardSystems Solutions, a large credit card payment processor in Tucson, 30
31 Arizona announced that forty million credit card numbers may have been stolen by 31
32 computer hackers. The theft was a direct result of the company's illegal practice of 32
33 retaining transaction records. It is insufficient to simply trust financial institutions' 33
34 abilities and intentions for secure data management. Thus, rather than putting faith 34
35 in the data management of financial institutions, we give a proactive solution for 35
36 protecting the disclosure of user's sensitive personal data with a cryptographic ap- 36
37 proach. 37

38 Our contributions are summarized as follows: 38

- 39
40 1. We propose a notarized federated identity management model that supports 40
41 automatic user authentications when the providers are unknown to each other. 41
42 Our model introduces a *notary server*, which is owned by a trusted third-party 42
43 to dynamically notarize assertions generated by identity providers. Assertions 43

1 are generated by identity providers and registered with a trusted notary server. 1
2 When a service provider needs to verify an assertion, it queries the notary 2
3 server to get a notarized assertion. The notary information shows that the iden- 3
4 tity provider is trusted by the notary server, and proves the trustworthiness of 4
5 the identity provider that generates the assertion. As an extra feature provided 5
6 by the notary server, our federated identity management model reduces possi- 6
7 ble collusions between identity providers and service providers, and gives 7
8 improved privacy protections for users. 8

- 9 2. We describe an efficient implementation of the federated identity management 9
10 protocol with the existing *Secure Transaction Management System (STMS)* [1, 10
11 14]. The notary server caches the assertions at a collection of responders de- 11
12 ployed in the network. Even when the responders are located in insecure, un- 12
13 trusted locations, a service provider can easily identify a forged or tampered 13
14 assertion so that the integrity of an assertions is maintained. 14

15 Our protocol is a concrete solution for a trust broker model proposed by exist- 15
16 ing federated identity management systems [27]. Besides brokering trust, our 16
17 solution offers additional features. *Accountability* is supported by archiving 17
18 signatures on requests and assertions. *User privacy* is achieved by encrypt- 18
19 ing assertions stored by the notary server. *Verification efficiency* is achieved 19
20 by using the authenticated-dictionary technique (see, e.g., [1,14,21,24]) imple- 20
21 mented in STMS. 21

- 22 3. We also give a practical solution for mitigating aspects of the identity theft 22
23 problem, and discuss how it is used in our federated identity management pro- 23
24 tocol. Our cryptographic solution is based on the *Identity-Based Encryption* 24
25 (*IBE*) scheme [6]. The main feature of our cryptographic solution is that it en- 25
26 ables one to proactively prevent the leaking of secret identity information. 26
27

28 1.3. Organization of the paper 28

29
30 Related work is given in Section 2. Our model for notarized federated identity 30
31 management is described in Section 3. The STMS implementation of the notarized 31
32 federated identity management protocol is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we 32
33 give an IBE-based authentication protocol. The security of the federated identity 33
34 management protocol and the IBE-based authentication protocol is analyzed in Sec- 34
35 tion 6. Conclusions are given in Section 7. 35
36

37 2. Related work 37

38
39
40 Our approach of using privacy protection as a means to avoid identity theft is 40
41 related to anonymous credential systems [8,9,12,17,30]. Anonymous credential sys- 41
42 tems (a.k.a. pseudonym systems) allow anonymous yet authenticated and account- 42
43 able transactions between users and service providers. 43

1 Existing anonymous credential systems are different from our single sign-on system, in that they do not consider a federated identity infrastructure behind the providers. In comparison, our system focuses on how to manage user authentication in the more realistic setting of a federation of providers. Our system achieves simple pseudonym solutions and efficient single sign-on by taking advantages of the federated structure. In particular, we do not need a credential system, because the assertions can be short-lived and generated on-line by identity providers.

8 In the past decade, the European Union and its member states have implemented a legal framework to provide guidance on processing of personal data with the specific aim to restore citizens' control over their data. To complement the legal framework, Camenisch et al. presented the architecture of PRIME (Privacy and Identity Management for Europe), which implements a technical framework for processing personal data [7]. PRIME focuses on enabling users to actively manage and control the release of their private information.

15 The federated identity management solution proposed by Bhargav-Spantzel, Squicciarini and Bertino [4] emphasizes the need for proving the knowledge of personal information without actually revealing it, in order to help prevent identity theft. In their solution, personal data such as a social security number is never transmitted in the clear. Commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs are used to commit data and prove the knowledge of the data. Our identity-based solution has a similar goal to this approach, but there is one important difference. In our solution, even attributes such as social security numbers and credit card numbers are stolen, the user's identity is not compromised. This is possible because every time the social security number or credit card number is used, the user needs to prove the possession of corresponding private keys via a tamper-resistant device. Our solution requires minimal changes to the existing financial and administrative infrastructure, as personal information in our scheme is stored the same way as it is currently. IBE [6] conveniently makes this possible, and, interestingly, this approach is also more efficient than zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocols.

30 BBAE is the federated identity-management protocol proposed by Pfitzmann and Waidner [22]. They give a concrete browser-based single sign-on protocol that aims at the security of communications and the privacy of user's attributes. Their protocol is based on a standard browser, and therefore does not require the user to install any program. The main difference with this and our approach is that we provide a notary mechanism for authenticating assertions when *IdP* and *SP* are not previous known to each other.

37 In the access control area, the closest work to ours is the framework for regulating service access and release of private information in web-services by Bonatti and Samarati [5]. They study the information disclosure using a language and policy approach. We designed cryptographic solutions to control and manage information exchange. Another related work aiming to protect user privacy in web-services is the point-based trust management model [29], which is a quantitative authorization model. Point-based authorization allows a consumer to optimize privacy loss by

Table 1

Comparisons of federated identity management systems

Systems	Notarized FIM	BBAE [22]	ZK-based FIM [3]	Idemix [9]	SAML [10]
Unknown providers	Yes	No	No	No	No
Brokering trust	Yes	No	No	No	No
IdP/SP separation	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
ID-theft mitigation	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Browser-based	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: The term *unknown providers* indicates support for identity providers and service providers who do not have pre-established trust. *Brokering trust* refers to whether the protocol supports unknown providers to establish trust via trusted third-party, which is the notary server in our protocol. The term *IdP/SP separation* refers to the lack of direct communication between an identity provider and a service provider about the user's information. This separation benefits the user in terms of privacy protection.

choosing a subset of attributes to disclose based on personal privacy preferences. The above two models mainly focus on the client-server model, whereas our architecture include two different types of providers.

A counter measure for identity theft through location cross-checking and information filtering was recently proposed [26]. This paper addresses the identity cloning problem, and proposes to use personal location devices such as GPS and central monitoring systems to ensure the uniqueness of identities. However, the central monitoring system in their solution is likely to be a performance bottleneck. Moreover, because identity thieves are geographically dispersed, distributing the monitoring task into several locations is not feasible. In comparison, our solution is simple and efficient to adopt. Because we tie the secret identification information to a tamper-resistant smart card (e.g., driver's license), card theft can be easily noticed and reported by the card owner.

We compare our solutions with existing federated identity management proposals in Table 1.

3. Notarized federated identity management

Our notarized federated identity management model introduces a *notary server*, a trusted third-party that dynamically maintains assertions generated by identity providers. Assertions are generated by identity providers and stored by the notary server. When a service provider needs to verify an assertion, it queries the notary server for a *notarized assertion* that shows the trustworthiness of the identity provider generating the assertion.

3.1. Notary server and notarized assertion

In a notarized ID federation, a notary server is trusted by both identity providers and service providers. Identity providers that have good Internet behavior and rep-

utation are allowed to register with the notary server, and thus are trusted. The notary server stores the assertions generated by registered identity providers. A notary server supports two operations, SUBMIT and QUERY:

- **SUBMIT**(id, S_{id}, sig): a registered identity provider IdP authenticates itself to the notary server, and submits via a secure channel the tuple (id , assertion, signature), denoted by (id, S_{id}, sig) , to the notary server. The assertion S_{id} states the attributes of an identity id , and the signature sig is signed by IdP on the assertion S_{id} . The notary server stores the tuple.
- **QUERY**(id): a service provider SP queries in a *public* (*insecure*) channel the notary server for assertions associated with identity id , and the notary server returns the *notarized assertion*(s).

A notarized assertion has a proof showing that the assertion is indeed stored by the notary server, which implies that the identity provider that generates the assertion is trustworthy. The reason for not using a secure channel in QUERY is for higher efficiency and scalability in a distributed environment. The challenge, thus, becomes how to efficiently generate and verify the notarized assertion, even when it is transmitted in a insecure channel. Our solution is based on the authenticated dictionary technique [1,14,21,24], which is more scalable than using a signature scheme.

The notary server provides the assurance of the trustworthiness of assertions when identity providers are unknown to the service providers. The notary server is a bridge of trust between providers in web-service transactions. Another advantage of storing assertions on the notary server is the prevention of direct contact between identity providers and service providers. A notarized assertion does not contain the name of the identity provider. This further increases the difficulty of collusions among providers to discover private user information.

We assume that the notary server is trustworthy, and is trusted by all entities (users, identity providers, service providers). The security properties of our notarized federated identity management protocol are summarized below and are analyzed in Section 6:

- *Security* is defined as that no polynomial-time adversary can forge a notarized assertion that can be accepted by a service provider.
- *Secrecy* is defined intuitively as that the protocol does not leak any information about a notarized assertion to a (polynomial-time) adversary. This property provides privacy protection to the users.
- *Accountability* is defined as that identity providers should be held accountable for the assertions generated, and for any unauthorized information disclosure about the users.

Note that the notary server only certifies that the source of an assertion is trustworthy; it is not required to examine and certify the content of an assertion. In fact, our protocol, which is described next, deliberately avoids disclosing assertion contents to the notary server by encrypting the assertions. This feature is for the purpose of

1 user privacy, and prevents the notary server from gaining knowledge of private user
 2 information.

3
 4 3.2. Protocol

5
 6 In this section, we present the protocol for our notarized federated identity man-
 7 agement model. The following entities participate in the protocol: a user, an identity
 8 provider, a service provider, and a notary server. The protocol gives an instantiation
 9 of operations SUBMIT and QUERY. Note that the roles of identity provider and ser-
 10 vice provider are interchangeable. For example, a bank can be the identity provider
 11 in one scenario and the service provider in another scenario.

12 We assume that the notary server knows the public keys of registered identity
 13 providers. In addition, the public key of the notary server is known by all of the
 14 providers. A schematic drawing of the protocol is shown in Fig. 1.

15 In the protocol, the user only needs to authenticate once to an identity provider.
 16 Subsequent requests for service from multiple service providers do not require the
 17 user for authentication. Nevertheless, for protecting personal privacy, the user is
 18 given the ability to examine the contents of assertions to be given to the service
 19 providers in our protocol. If the assertions are generated by the identity provider ac-
 20 cording to the user's request, then they are passed on to the service providers. We
 21 argue that having the user involved in the identity management protocol for privacy
 22 purpose is a feasible solution. This concept was also proposed by other federated
 23 identity management solution [3]. The process can be automated to minimize the
 24 user's manual participation.

25 Public parameters include a collision-resistant one-way hash function, H , that
 26 takes a binary string of arbitrary length and hashes to a binary string of fixed length k :
 27




Fig. 1. Overview of the notarized federated identity management protocol.

1 $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. For the blinding purpose, the public parameters also include
 2 two public strings P_1 and P_2 . Providers also agree on a symmetric-key encryption
 3 scheme for blinding and unblinding assertions. The encryption and decryption of a
 4 message x with a secret key K are denoted as $E_K(x)$ and $D_K(x)$, respectively. Our
 5 protocol is described as follows:

- 6 1. The user requests services from a service provider SP . SP requires attribute
 7 information of the user needed to complete the service.
- 8 2. SP opens a secure communication channel with the user. The user and SP each
 9 generate a random integer of the same length. They first exchange the crypto-
 10 graphic hashes of these integers as commitments using the secure channel, and
 11 then they exchange the integers using the secure channel. The session_ID N
 12 is finally computed as the XOR of the two integers. SP also informs the user
 13 of the attribute names that are needed for the service (e.g., billing address and
 14 age).
- 15 3. The user authenticates to her identity provider IdP . If the authentication is suc-
 16 cessful, the user opens a secure channel with IdP , and transmits a *signed* re-
 17 quest that contains the session_ID and the required attribute names.
- 18 4. IdP verifies and stores the signed request by the user. The signature is for the
 19 accountability purpose in case of dispute (see Section 6).
- 20 5. IdP then computes the *index* of the assertion as the hash of session_ID con-
 21 catenated with the public parameter P_1 : $h = H(N, P_1)$. It then generates an
 22 assertion S_h about the user using index h . For example, S_h states that h is a
 23 university student.
- 24 6. To prevent information leaking, IdP blinds the assertion as follows:
 25
 - 26 (a) IdP computes the *blinding factor* K as the hash of the session_ID concate-
 27 nated with the public parameter P_2 : $K = H(N, P_2)$;
 - 28 (b) IdP encrypts S_h with the symmetric encryption scheme, using K as the
 29 secret key. This gives the *blinded assertion* $S'_h = E_K(S_h)$.

30 The blinded assertion S'_h is signed by IdP with its private key, which gives a
 31 signature sig_h .

- 32 7. IdP runs $\text{SUBMIT}(h, S'_h, sig_h)$ with the notary server to submit tuple $(h, S'_h,$
 33 $sig_h)$ through a secure channel as follows:
 34
 - 35 (a) IdP first authenticates to the notary server to establish a secure communi-
 36 cation channel;
 - 37 (b) IdP then transmits tuple (h, S'_h, sig_h) to the notary server;
 - 38 (c) The notary server verifies signature sig_h , and stores (S'_h, sig_h) indexed
 39 by h . The signature is stored for accountability purposes.
- 40 8. The user computes the index $h = H(N, P_1)$ from N and P_1 , and runs
 41 $\text{QUERY}(h)$ to obtain the assertion for h . The notary server processes the query
 42 as follows:
 43

- 1 (a) The blinded assertion S'_h associated with index h is retrieved;
- 2 (b) The notary server *notarizes* the assertion S'_h , and returns the notarized as-
- 3 ssertion. We describe two approaches for the realization of notarized asser-
- 4 tion in the following sections. Note that the QUERY operation between the
- 5 user and the notary server does not require a secure channel.
- 6
- 7 9. Once the user obtains the returned notarized blinded assertion, she unblinds it
- 8 with the blinding factor $K = H(N, P_2)$. This is done by decrypting S'_h with
- 9 K , which gives $S_h = D_K(S'_h)$. The user verifies that the assertion does not
- 10 release any unauthorized personal information about her.
- 11 10. The notarized blinded assertion is then relayed from the user to the service
- 12 provider, who verifies that it is notarized by the notary server. This implies
- 13 that the identity provider *IdP* is trusted by the notary server. If the verification
- 14 succeeds, the assertion S'_h is unblinded in the same way as in Step 9. The
- 15 attribute information is obtained from the assertion, and index h is compared
- 16 with the hash $H(N, P_1)$ of session_ID N and P_1 . The user is then granted the
- 17 service if the verification passes. The service provider also stores the notarized
- 18 assertion for accountability purposes.

19 The computation of blinding factor K and index h is equivalent to using two
 20 different hash functions on the session_ID N , i.e., $h = H_1(N)$ and $K = H_2(N)$,
 21 where H_1 and H_2 are collision-resistant one-way hash functions.
 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

24 **4. Realization of notarized assertions**

27 Notarized assertions can be realized using simple time-stamped signatures. The
 28 notary server individually signs every assertion and the current time-stamp with its
 29 private key. The notarized assertion consists of this signature along with the asser-
 30 tion and time-stamp. To verify a notarized assertion, the service provider verifies the
 31 signature against the public key of the notary server, which can be obtained through
 32 usual means such as a public key certificate. Because the notary server is trusted, the
 33 correct verification of the signature establishes the authenticity of the assertion about
 34 the index identifier $Hash(N, P_1)$. Namely, the security of the signature-based real-
 35 ization of notarized assertions follows directly from the security of the underlying
 36 signature scheme adopted.

37 Even though the service provider cannot tell which identity provider generated the
 38 assertion, trusting the notary server is sufficient for authenticating the user in most
 39 applications such as on-line shopping. In addition, not knowing the source of asser-
 40 tions prevents, to some degree, the service providers from colluding with identity
 41 providers to discover information about the user. Because of the use of session_ID,
 42 the notary server and the service providers do not know the actual identities associ-
 43 ated with assertions.

1 In the above approach, notarizing assertions can be a performance bottleneck be- 1
2 cause the notary server needs to sign every individual assertion. To improve the effi- 2
3 ciency of the notary server, we give an improved realization of notarized assertions 3
4 using the secure transaction management system (STMS). 4

5 The main advantage of implementing notary assertions with STMS in comparison 5
6 to the simple time-stamped signature approach is its high efficiency of computation. 6
7 The notary server only needs to generate one signature as opposed to a signature 7
8 for each assertion. In addition, STMS also provides a distributed architecture for 8
9 fast real-time dissemination of assertion updates. STMS has been previously used 9
10 to build an accredited domainkeys framework for secure e-mail systems [15]. Next, we 10
11 first introduce the components and algorithms of STMS, then we describe how to 11
12 use STMS to scale up the notary service. 12

13 4.1. Secure Transaction Management System (STMS) 13

14 14
15 15
16 The computational abstraction underlying STMS is a data structure called an *au-* 16
17 *thenticated dictionary* (see, e.g., [1,14,19,21,24,25]), which is a system for publish- 17
18 ing data and supporting authenticated responses to queries about the data. In an au- 18
19 thenticated dictionary, the data originates at a secure central site, called *STMS source* 19
20 and is distributed to servers scattered across the network, called *STMS responders*. 20
21 The responders answer queries on behalf of the source about the data made by clients. 21
22 It is desirable to delegate query answering to the responders for two reasons: (1) the 22
23 source is subject to risks such as denial-of-service attacks if it provides services di- 23
24 rectly on the network, and (2) the large volume and diverse geographic origination 24
25 of the queries require distributed servers to provide responses efficiently. 25


26 The main feature of STMS is that it maintains trust even when responders are lo- 26
27 cated in insecure, untrusted locations. That is, when a client submits a query to an 27
28 STMS responder, it gets back not only an answer but also a proof of the answer. The 28
29 client can easily validate the answer and determine that the responder has not been 29
30 tampered with, while relying solely on trusted statements signed by the source. The 30
31 design of STMS allows untrusted responders, which do not store private keys, to pro- 31
32 vide verifiable authentication services on behalf of a trusted source. This nonintuitive 32
33 yet mathematically provable fact is the key to achieve cost effectiveness. 33

34 The STMS source sends real-time updates to the responders together with a spe- 34
35 cial signed time-stamped fingerprint of the database called the *basis*. A user's query 35
36 to the responder asks whether an element is contained in the authenticated dictionary 36
37 maintained by STMS source. A responder replies to the query with an authenticated 37
38 response. This consists of the answer to the query, the proof of the answer, the basis 38
39 and its signature signed by the STMS source. Informally speaking, the proof is a *par-* 39
40 *tial fingerprint* of the database that, combined with the subject of the query, should 40
41 yield the fingerprint of the entire database. A proof consists of a very small amount of 41
42 data (less than 300 bytes for most applications) and can be validated quickly against 42
43 the signed basis by a client. 43

1 The signature of the basis is verified using the source public-key and the current
 2 time quantum. If the signature is not valid, then the basis is not valid. This may
 3 indicate that the basis or the source public-key is tampered by the STMS responder
 4 from which the values are obtained. The user verifies the answer for element x by
 5 simply hashing the values of the returned sequence $Q(x)$ of hash values in the given
 6 order, and comparing the result with the signed value $f(s)$, where s is the basis
 7 value. If the two values agree, then the user is assured of the validity of the answer
 8 at the time given by the time-stamp. The authenticated dictionary data structure can
 9 be implemented using Merkle hash tree [20]. The data structure [14] used in STMS
 10 system is based on skip list, which is more efficient than a Merkle hash tree. We refer
 11 readers to the authenticated dictionary literature [1,14] for more information.

12
 13 **4.2. Realization of notarized assertions with STMS**

14
 15 In Fig. 2, we show a schematic drawing of the STMS implemented notarized federated
 16 identity management protocol. Using STMS, the notary server consists of a
 17 *notary source* and several *notary responders*. The notary source needs to be a trusted
 18 server that stores assertion inputs from identity providers. Notary responders can
 19 be strategically placed in geographically dispersed locations to accommodate fast
 20 queries. They obtain real-time updates from the notary source, and answer queries
 21 from users. Notary responders do not need to be trusted servers. The notarized as-
 22 sertions returned by them can be authenticated by verifying against the public key of
 23 the notary source by anyone.



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 41 Fig. 2. A schematic drawing of the STMS implemented notarized federated identity management protocol.
 42 At each time quantum, the notary source sends the signed basis and updates of the authenticated dictionary
 43 to the notary responder. The notary responder answers a query for assertion by returning the signed basis
 and the proof corresponding to the queried element.

1 With STMS, a notarized assertion returned by QUERY operation consists of two 1
2 parts: assertion itself and a STMS proof. As described in the previous section, the 2
3 proof is a sequence of hash values of elements in the notary server for proving the 3
4 existence of the assertion. The size of the proof is quite compact, even for large num- 4
5 ber of items in the notary server. Therefore, transmitting the proof can be quite fast. 5
6 The service provider then obtains the signed STMS basis of the current time quan- 6
7 tum from the notary responder, if it does not yet have it. The proof of the assertion is 7
8 verified against the basis, and the signature of the basis is verified against the public 8
9 key of the notary source. If the verification is successful, the request is granted. The 9
10 signed basis remains the same for the duration of a time quantum, therefore it only 10
11 needs to be obtained once for each time quantum. The rest of the notarized federated 11
12 identity management protocol with STMS follows the protocol in Section 3.2. 12

13 Because notary responders are not required to be trusted servers, storing 13
14 session_ID in the clear is not secure – a notary responder may attempt to impersonate 14
15 a user with the session_ID for service. Note that opening a secure communication 15
16 between the service provider and the notary responder does not solve this problem. 16
17 Our notarized federated identity management protocol in Section 3 is resilient to this 17
18 problem, because assertions use hashed session_ID rather than the plain session_ID. 18
19 In addition, the service provider transmits the plain session_ID to the user in a se- 19
20 cure channel. A schematic drawing of the STMS implemented notarized federated 20
21 identity management protocol is shown in Fig. 2. The time quantum can be set to as 21
22 short as orders of milliseconds to allow fast dissemination of assertions. Due to page 22
23 limit, the protocol and security of STMS implemented notarized federated identity 23
24 management are not presented. The security is based on the security of STMS, which 24
25 has been previously proved [1]. 25

26 Next, we present an authentication protocol that effectively reduces the identity 26
27 theft problem. We also describe how to integrate the authentication protocol with 27
28 our notarized federated identity management protocol. 28
29 29
30 30

31 5. Reducing the risks of identity theft 31

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33 33
34 Recently, several practical solutions against on-line identity theft have been pro- 34
35 posed [3,18]. In this section, we first analyze causes of a successful identity theft. 35
36 Then, we give a practical solution, and describe how to use our scheme in our nota- 36
37 rized federated identity management protocol. 37

38 5.1. Identity theft and its causes 38

39 39
40 40
41 Identity theft is a type of crime in which an imposter obtains key pieces of per- 41
42 sonal information, such as Social Security or driver's license numbers, in order to 42
43 impersonate someone else. Although an identity thief might crack into a database 43

1 to obtain personal information, it is believed that a thief is more likely to obtain in- 1
2 formation using Trojans or even old-fashion methods such as dumpster diving and 2
3 shoulder surfing. 3

4 We observe that the current authentication protocols, both physical and digital 4
5 ones, are fundamentally susceptible to identity theft, even if an individual is care- 5
6 ful in protecting her sensitive information. Physical authentication protocols include 6
7 the procedures for obtaining a driver's license at a government office, opening a 7
8 bank account, and applying for mortgage. Digital authentication protocols include 8
9 the corresponding on-line transactions. In current solutions, key pieces of personal 9
10 information are usually communicated in the clear or stored in the clear. This makes 10
11 stealing of information easier for identity thieves. Although the SSL protocol en- 11
12 crypts communications between a user and a server, this does not prevent Trojan 12
13 keyloggers, or shoulder surfing, because the user still needs to disclose and type over 13
14 and over sensitive information such as her social security number. 14

15 We argue that this fundamental characteristic of the existing authentication proto- 15
16 cols is one of the main causes of identity theft, namely using sensitive information in 16
17 clear form for authentication. We propose a simple and practical cryptographic pro- 17
18 tocol for authentication. Our solution ties personal information to random secrets, 18
19 which are used to prove *interactively* the ownership of the personal information but 19
20 are *never disclosed*. 20

21 *Motivation for using IBE* 21

22 In public key encryption schemes, the private key information is never disclosed. 22
23 Yet, a challenge-response process can be used by a user to prove the possession of 23
24 the private key to an identity provider. The private key is usually protected by en- 24
25 crypting it with a passphrase, and storing it in a portable device, such as a smart card 25
26 or a USB flash drive. Observe that the private key is never disclosed in clear during 26
27 transactions, hence it never appears in any printed form or display. Therefore, it is 27
28 difficult for attackers to retrieve someone's private key using standard identity theft 28
29 techniques. To steal the private key, an attacker would need to obtain the physical 29
30 device and know the passphrase. In order to associate identity information with pub- 30
31 lic keys, the only known encryption scheme is the Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) 31
32 scheme [6,23,28]. A public key in IBE will be the personal information (e.g., the 32
33 social security number of an individual). For authentication, an individual not only 33
34 needs to know her personal information (e.g., social security number), but also needs 34
35 to prove the possession of the corresponding private key for authentication. 35
36

37 *5.2. A cryptographic authentication protocol* 37

38
39 We propose to use ID-based encryption scheme for implementing an authentica- 39
40 tion protocol for sensitive personal information. Our protocol minimizes the expo- 40
41 sure of secret personal information and thus is more robust against identity theft than 41
42 existing authentication methods. Entities in our protocol include a user, an ID au- 42
43 thority, an identity provider, and a revocation server controlled by the ID authority. 43




Fig. 3. A diagram of the IBE-based authentication protocol.

Our authentication protocol has the following operations: SETUP, REGISTER, AUTHENTICATE and REFRESH. It requires an on-line revocation server maintained by the ID authority.

Refreshing the secret key of identity information can be tricky, because the identity information typically does not change, e.g. social security number. We show later how to use multiple pieces of identity information and on-line revocation checking to leverage this. A diagram of the protocol is shown in Fig. 3. Here, we describe the realization of the above operations with IBE scheme:

1. **SETUP:** The ID authority runs the PKG SETUP operation of IBE.
2. **REGISTER:** A user requests for an *ID-based private key* from an ID authority. The user needs to be physically present in the ID office, for example the passport office, with paper identifications such as passport, birth certificate. The ID authority authenticates the user's identity. If the user's identity is verified, the ID authority generates the ID-based private key for the user. The ID authority runs the EXTRACT operation of IBE with the user's *ID-based public key*, which is the user's identity information concatenated with a unique serial number l . For example, l can be the driver's license number. l is used for revocation purpose. Because the identity information such as social security number cannot be easily revoked, we need an additional replaceable field l . Note that l cannot be any random number, because using a random value as public key requires public-key certification, which defies the purpose of identity-based encryption. In what follows, we use the driver's license number as l . The ID-based private key generated by EXTRACT is given to the user. The user's driver's license can be equipped with a smart card chip and store the private key.
3. **AUTHENTICATE:** The user and the identity provider engage in a challenge-response protocol as follows:

- 1 (a) The user gives his ID-based public key to the identity provider, which is 1
 2 the identity information concatenated with the driver's license number l to 2
 3 the identity provider. 3
 4 (b) The identity provider picks a random nonce m . It runs ENCRYPT of IBE 4
 5 to encrypt m using the user's ID-based public key. 5
 6 (c) The ciphertext is given to the user, who runs DECRYPT of IBE with his ID- 6
 7 based private key. If the user is unable to correctly decrypt the ciphertext, 7
 8 the authentication fails and returns false. 8
 9 (d) The identity provider queries the revocation server maintained by the ID 9
 10 authority for the number l in the public key of the user. If l has been re- 10
 11 voked, then the authentication fails. Otherwise, the authentication is suc- 11
 12 cessful and returns true. 12

13 4. REFRESH: The ID authority refreshes the ID-based private key of the user as 13
 14 follows: 14

- 15 (a) The user authenticates his current ID-based public key to the ID authority. 15
 16 (b) The ID authority puts the driver's license number l on the revocation server 16
 17 to indicate that l has been revoked. 17
 18 (c) The ID authority generates a new driver's license number l' for the user. 18
 19 The new ID-based public key of the user associated with his identity infor- 19
 20 mation is that identity information concatenated with l' . For example, the 20
 21 public key is 999-99-9999 \circ 1234567890, where 999-99-9999 is the social 21
 22 security number and 1234567890 is the new driver's license number l' . 22
 23 (d) The ID authority runs EXTRACT of IBE to compute a new private key, 23
 24 which is transmitted to the user via a secure channel or in person. The user 24
 25 stores the new ID-based private key in his smart card. 25
 26 26

27
 28 The main advantage of our authentication protocol is that the secret personal in- 28
 29 formation is not released during the transaction, which minimizes identity theft at- 29
 30 tacks such as dumpster diving and shoulder surfing. Our protocol can be used in any 30
 31 user authentication applications. In particular, it can be used in any federated iden- 31
 32 tity management system when a user authenticates his personal information with an 32
 33 identity provider. For example, a user is required to run the AUTHENTICATE algo- 33
 34 rithm with the identity provider when his social security number is needed. Without 34
 35 the corresponding private key, it is impossible for an identity thief to accomplish this. 35
 36 36

37 6. Security analysis 37

38 In this section, we first analyze the security of the notarized federated identity 38
 39 management protocol, and then analyze the IBE-based authentication protocol. 39

40 The security of our notarized federated identity management protocol is analyzed 40
 41 from the perspectives of the user, the identity provider, the service provider and the 41
 42 42
 43 43

1 notary server, as each of them has different requirements on the security provided by 1
2 the system. In what follows, we assume the existence of a signature scheme that is 2
3 secure against existential forgery by polynomial-time adversaries in the security pa- 3
4 rameter of the signature scheme. Existential forgery means that an adversary forges 4
5 a signature that the notary server has not signed in the past. An adversary in our 5
6 protocol can monitor traffics in unsecured channels, request for services, request the 6
7 identity provider to blind assertions of her choice, and request the notary server to 7
8 notarize assertions of her choice. 8

9 We assume that the notary server is trustworthy, and is trusted by all entities (users, 9
10 identity providers, service providers). All entities are assumed to follow the federated 10
11 identity management protocol presented in Section 3. The following theorem states 11
12 the nonforgeability of a notarized assertion. 12
13

14 **Theorem 1.** *In the notarized federated identity management protocol, no polyno- 14
15 mial-time adversary can successfully forge a valid notarized assertion that is not 15
16 generated by the notary server. 16*

17
18 We give two implementations of the notarized assertion. One is based on a simple 18
19 signature scheme, the other is based on STMS. In both implementations, forging a 19
20 notarized assertion is equivalent to forging the signature of the notary server at a 20
21 time quantum. This is infeasible, assuming the existence of a signature scheme that 21
22 is secure against existential-forgery attacks. Therefore, the theorem holds. 22

23 For the privacy protection of a user, an important privacy requirement is the secrecy 23
24 of assertions. This is summarized in the following theorem. 24
25

26
27 **Theorem 2.** *Assume the existence of a collision-resistant one-way hash function, 27
28 and a secure symmetric key encryption scheme. In the notarized federated identity 28
29 management protocol, a polynomial-time adversary and untrusted notary responders 29
30 cannot obtain any information from a blinded assertion. 30*

31
32 **Proof sketch.** We will prove that (1) the key is difficult to guess and (2) the blinded 32
33 assertion is pseudorandom. An assertion is encrypted by the identity provider using 33
34 a symmetric key encryption scheme that is secure in the sense of an adversary's 34
35 inability to distinguish the output from a random string [2]. The secret key for the 35
36 encryption/decryption is computed as $H(N, P_2)$, where H is a collision-resistant 36
37 one-way hash function, N is the session_ID, P_2 is a public parameter, and “;” denotes 37
38 concatenation. Given the public index $H(N, P_1)$ of an assertion, where P_1 is another 38
39 public parameter, the secret key is difficult to guess. This is because of the collision- 39
40 resistant and one-way properties of the hash function H . In addition, the blinded 40
41 assertion is indistinguishable from a random string, because of the security of the 41
42 encryption scheme. Therefore, adversaries and untrusted notary responders cannot 42
43 obtain any information from the blinded assertions. 43

1 For decentralized authorization systems such as the federated identity manage- 1
2 ment, an important security requirement is accountability. To prevent possible dis- 2
3 putes, identity providers should be held accountable for the assertions that they 3
4 have generated. In addition, to prevent unauthorized information exchange among 4
5 providers, users should be able to dispute any fraudulent assertion requests. These 5
6 properties are achieved in our protocol. 6
7

8 **Theorem 3.** *In the notarized federated identity management protocol, the identity 8
9 provider is held accountable for the assertions that it generates.* 9
10

11 **Proof.** The notary server stores the signed (blinded) assertion submitted by an iden- 11
12 tity provider in Step 7c of our notarized federated identity management protocol. 12
13 In case of a dispute between a service provider and an identity provider on the val- 13
14 idity of an assertion, the notary server reveals the signature, which is used to hold 14
15 the identity provider accountable for generating the assertion. Therefore, Theorem 3 15
16 holds. 16
17

18 **Theorem 4.** *In the notarized federated identity management protocol, providers are 18
19 held accountable for any unauthorized information exchange among them.* 19
20

21 **Proof.** In our protocol, an identity provider should only generates assertions based 21
22 on a *signed* request from a user. The identity provider is required to keep the signed 22
23 requests for its own record in Step 4 of our notarized federated identity management 23
24 protocol. Once unauthorized information sharing among providers is detected, the 24
25 identity provider is not able to show any signed request by the user. Hence, it is 25
26 responsible for the information leak. 26
27

28 **Theorem 5.** *The notarized federated identity management protocol is secure against 28
29 replay attacks.* 29
30

31 It is easy to see that Theorem 5 holds, because the session ID is randomly gener- 31
32 ated for each service request and the notarized assertions are generated by the notary 32
33 server with the time-stamp information. 33
34

35 7. Conclusions 36 37

38 The paper aims at protecting consumer identity information in E-commerce by 38
39 developing two cryptographic identity management solutions. One is called the no- 39
40 tarized federated identity management framework that provides authentication ser- 40
41 vices on identity assertions among federated providers. Using this framework, a no- 41
42 tary server is introduced to serve as an identity broker that bridges service providers, 42
43 identity providers, and users, so that providers may establish transactions without 43

1 requiring prior trust relationship. The ultimate goal of having an effective federated 1
2 provider framework such as the one proposed is to achieve single sign-on in Internet 2
3 and thus to provide a more systematic and scientific way of managing personal identi- 3
4 tity. We also developed an identity authentication protocol based on Identity-Based 4
5 Encryption and tamper-resistant smart cards. Our protocol increases the difficulty 5
6 level of identity thefts, as it requires two factors to authenticate an identity attribute 6
7 (e.g., both the credit card number and its corresponding private key). 7

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