Scaling Cryptographic Techniques by Exploiting Data Sensitivity at a Public Cloud

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Goal: Increase efficiency of cryptographic techniques

Existing Problem


Cryptographic techniques are:

- i. Not efficient
- ii. Prone to various attacks

Technique	Time	Resilient to attacks		
		Size	Workloa d-skew	Access- pattern
DET Enc.	1.43x			
Non-DET Enc.	2.1x			
Distributed Searchable Enc.	3281x			~
SGX	6724x			
Full-Retrieval	11235x	/	/	\
Homomorphic + ORAM	>11235x			✓
x: The time to search a predicate in cleartext. ✓: A technique is resilient to a given attack.				

2 Partition Computation

- Partition the data into sensitive and non-sensitive
- Sensitive data is cryptographically secure
- Non-sensitive data is in cleartext



Inference Attacks due to Data Partitioning

Adversarial view what the adversary observes

Query	Retuned tuples		
value	From sensitive data	From non-sensitive data	
John	t_2	\mathbf{t}_{5}	
Adam	$ \mathbf{t}_1 $	Null	


Query Binning

Partition Data Security

- No linking of sensitive and non-sensitive values
- Not revealing #tuples with each sensitive value


Idea of Query Binning


- Distribute "values" into a matrix
- Rows become sensitive bins
- Columns become non-sensitive bins



Performance


 $\eta = \frac{Cost_{crypt}(|SB|,S)}{Cost_{Crypt}(1,D)} + \frac{Cost_{plain}(|NSB|,NS)}{Cost_{Crypt}(1,D)}$





Interesting Facts

- Works for any number of sensitive and nonsensitive values
- Improves an underlying cryptographic technique by preventing output-size and frequency-count attacks
- Supports conjunctive selection, join, and range queries



Reference

S. Mehrotra et al. Partitioned Data Security on Outsourced Sensitive and Non-sensitive Data. ICDE, 2019.