Algorithms for oblivious random access machine (ORAM) simulation allow a client, Alice, to obfuscate a pattern of data accesses with a server, Bob, who is maintaining Alice's outsourced data while trying to learn information about her data. We present a novel ORAM scheme that improves the asymptotic I/O overhead of previous schemes for a wide range of size parameters for clientside private memory and message blocks, from logarithmic to polynomial. Our method achieves statistical security for hiding Alice's access pattern and, with high probability, achieves an I/O overhead that ranges from $O(1)$ to $O(\log^2 n/(\log\log n)^2)$, depending on these size parameters, where $n$ is the size of Alice's outsourced memory. Our scheme, which we call BIOS ORAM, combines multiple uses of B-trees with a reduction of ORAM simulation to isogrammic access sequences.
(Based on a paper by Mike Goodrich at WPES'17.)